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The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")' prohibits employers
from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability,"' which
the Act defines as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."3 Consistent
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Id.§ 12112(a).
3. Id. § 12111(8).
with this definition,4 the ADA not only prohibits employers from
intentionally discriminating against qualified individuals because of their
disabilities'-what is sometimes referred to as garden variety disparate
treatment -but also makes it unlawful for employers to fail to make
reasonable accommodations for such individuals' "known physical or
mental limitations."7
For purposes of these provisions, the ADA defines a disability to
include: (1) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more" of an individual's major life activities,8 which is often referred to as
an "actual disability," 9 (2) "a record of such an impairment,"' or (3) "being
regarded as having such an impairment."" In this sense, the text of the ADA
4. See generally Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 907 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) ("[T]he
issues of whether [an individual] is an otherwise qualified disabled individual and of whether [an]
employer is able to reasonably accommodate its disabled employee are intertwined."), affd, 62 F.3d
843 (6th Cir. 1995).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1342 (M.D. Ala.
1998) ("[The ADA's] purpose is to prohibit intentional discrimination against a disabled person
because of that disability.").
6. See Thomas Simmons, South Dakota's Disability Discrimination Laws: Limits and Vantages,
47 S.D. L. REV. 389, 413 (2002) ("Disparate treatment is the garden variety sort of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. It occurs, for example, when an individual is fired-or not
hired-because of the individual's disability."); cf Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d
6, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (criticizing an employer for treating an employee's claim as if it was a "garden
variety claim of discrimination" when the real issue was that the employer "failed to make any
reasonable effort to accommodate her disability").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306
(3d Cir. 1999) ("Discrimination under the ADA encompasses not only adverse actions motivated by
prejudice and fear of disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable accommodations for a
plaintiff's disabilities."); Gretillat v. Care Initiatives, 414 F. Supp. 2d 901, 906-07 (N.D. Iowa 2006)
("An employer can discriminate by failing to reasonably accommodate a known physical limitation
of an employee.").
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
9. See Murphy v. Facet 58, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (D. Utah 2004) ("'Disability'
under the ADA is a term of art and can refer to an individual who has an actual disability which
'substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual' .... (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2))); Ragan v. Jeffboat LLC, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062-63 (S.D. Ind. 2001)
(observing that "an 'actual' disability ... is[] a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A))).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); see also Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 442
(N.D. Cal. 1995). A number of state statutes "also proscribe[] discrimination based on a 'record
of ... impairment,"' and the primary import of these statutes is that, as under the ADA, "an
employer or prospective employer may not decline to hire, or terminate the employment of, an
individual with a history of disability." Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (D. Minn.
1989) (quoting MiNN. STAT. § 363A.03 subdiv. 12(2) (2004)). There is virtually no state court
authority addressing whether these state laws also impose upon employers an affirmative duty to
accommodate individuals with a history of disability. See, e.g., McLain v. Andersen Windows, Inc.,
10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (19 Am. Disabilities Cases) 306 (D. Minn. March 6, 2007) (observing that
"Minnesota case law does not resolve the issue"). Most state courts considering the issue
presumably would seek guidance from cases construing "the analogous provision of the ADA."
Thomann v. Lakes Reg'l MHMR Ctr., 162 S.W.3d 788, 797 (Tex. App. 2005).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); see also Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112
F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The definition in the ADA of 'disability' covers three categories,
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does not differentiate between the Act's prohibition of intentional
discrimination and its imposition of an affirmative duty to accommodate,1
2
and thus appears to extend the Act's reasonable accommodation obligation
equally to all three statutorily defined types of disabilities. 3
Despite the breadth of the ADA's definitional provisions, 4 the interplay
between the Act's protection of individuals with a record of a substantially
limiting impairment (commonly known as a "record of disability")' 5 and the
employer's duty to accommodate a disabled individual's limitations is a
complex' 6 and unsettled question." The text of the ADA does not
including the mere perception that someone is disabled.").
12. See Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA's "Major Life Activity"
Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 195 (1999) (noting that "the antidiscrimination and
accommodation requirements of the ADA share the same definition of disability"); cf Erickson v.
Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 959 (7th Cir. 2000)
(Wood, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the accommodation duty and the duty to avoid discrimination
are nothing more than two sides of the same coin").
13. See D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005) ("The text of
[the] statute simply offers no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities in
determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation and which are not."); cf Cigan v.
Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that any person who is
"statutorily disabled" under the ADA might be entitled to "the full set of accommodations
appropriate to a genuinely disabled person") (parenthesis omitted).
14. See generally Cox v. Ala. State Bar, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (M.D. Ala. 2005) ("The
word 'discriminate' is defined broadly to include 'not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."'
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000))); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 920
F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (D. Colo. 1996) ("The ADA defines 'disability' in very broad terms."), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997).
15. See McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 2001) ("A record of disability is a
history of impairment that substantially limited a major life activity of a plaintiff."); cf Eshelman v.
Agere Sys., Inc., 16 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 481, 483 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("Prohibiting
discrimination against an individual with a record of disability is intended to protect an individual
with a history of disability, regardless of whether the individual is currently substantially limited in a
major life activity.").
16. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (characterizing
the question of "whether a plaintiff who relies exclusively on .. . the 'record of a substantially
limiting impairment' standard is legally entitled to reasonable accommodations" as a "difficult"
issue[]); cf Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 (D.P.R. 1999)
(observing that the "inquiry into reasonable accommodation is one of the most complex aspects of
the ADA"). But cf Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The reasonable
accommodation requirement is easily applied in a case of an actual disability.").
17. See Mash v. Xerox Corp., No. 98-506 GMS, 2000 WL 1728250, at *11 n.18 (D. Del. Apr.
11, 2000) ("It is not clear ... that employees who meet only the 'record of' . . . definition[] of
'disability' are entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA."); Cary LaCheen, Using Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs, 8 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y I, 86 (2001) ("[T]he question of whether individuals with a 'record of'
disability are entitled to reasonable accommodations is unsettled in the case law.").
definitively resolve the issue,18 and there is as yet relatively little case law
addressing it' 9 (or, for that matter, any other aspect of the ADA's record of
disability provision).2 ° Moreover, those few courts that have discussed
whether an employer is obligated to accommodate an individual with a
record of disability are not in agreement as to how that question should be
resolved.2'
This article explores the issue,22 which has been described as a
controversial question "worthy of study. 23 The article begins with a brief
overview of the ADA's record of disability provision.2 4 The article then
18. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The precise
scope of the 'record of impairment' prong of the statute is not entirely clear as it relates to the right
to demand reasonable accommodations of the employer."); Fontanilla v. City & County of S.F., 11
Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1207, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (observing that "the terms of the
ADA are ambiguous with respect to the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to
employees ... who are not actually disabled").
19. See, e.g., Barnes v. Nw. Iowa Health Ctr., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1090 n.17 (N.D. Iowa 2002)
("The Eighth Circuit has not squarely addressed whether a failure-to-accommodate claim is a viable
cause of action when the ADA plaintiff is disabled because of a 'record of' disability."); see also
John Gustafson, Accommodations in "Record of" Cases Will Be Next Big ADA Issue, Attorney Says,
EEO UPDATE, Oct. 14, 1999, at 2 ("The courts have only just begun to consider the applicability of
the reasonable accommodation requirement to the 'record of' category of ADA protection .... );
James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has
Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 39 (2005) ("1 am unaware of
any decision regarding accommodation requirements in 'record of' claims .... ).
20. One commentator recently described the record of disability provision as the "least debated,
least understood, and most poorly considered" aspect of the ADA, and lamented that the provision
has been so thoroughly ignored by the courts and commentators that it "barely exists in practice
anymore." Alex B. Long, (Whatever Happened to) The ADA 's "Record Of" Prong(?), 81 WASH. L.
REV. 669, 673 (2006); see also Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1267, 1285 n.
111 (2006) ("There have been very few cases under [the 'record of] definition in the nearly sixteen
years since the ADA's enactment .... ).
21. See Rule v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 15 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1558, 1569 n.21 (N.D.
II1. 2004) ("[W]hile there is substantial authority in support of the view that a plaintiff is not entitled
to 'reasonable accommodation' if he is not in fact disabled, the caselaw is not uniform and the
competing arguments are sufficiently strong that reasonable minds can disagree."); Helen A. Schartz
et al., Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of Current Employees, 75 Miss. L.J. 917, 922
(2006) ("To date, the federal courts are split as to whether individuals ... 'with a record of a
disability are ensured workplace accommodations under the ADA.").
22. There has been surprisingly little academic consideration of the issue, even though "[t]he
'record of' definition of disability is likely to be the subject of future litigation with regard to an
employer's reasonable accommodation duty." Nancy L. Abell et al., The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Rights, Responsibilities and Recent Results, SL061 ALI-ABA 737, 792 (2006); see
also Gustafson, supra note 19, at I ("[T]he next big [ADA] issue ... will be whether reasonable
accommodations are required for individuals with records of substantially limiting impairments.").
23. See Peter David Blanck, Commentary, Civil Rights, Learning Disability, and Academic
Standards, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 33, 56-57 (1998); see also Long, supra note 20, at 721 ("One
of the more interesting questions with regard to an ADA plaintiff's prima facie case is whether an
employer must accommodate an individual with a history of disability.").
24. For broader academic discussions of the record of disability provision, see Justin S. Gilbert,
Prior History, Present Discrimination, and the ADA 's "Record Of' Disability, 31 U. MEM. L. REV.
659 (2001); Long, supra note 20.
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discusses the competing views of whether an employer is obligated to
accommodate the limitations of an individual with a record of disability.
25
The article ultimately concludes that the question of whether such an
individual is entitled to an accommodation should be determined on an
individualized, case-by-case basis.
26
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ADA'S RECORD OF DISABILITY PROVISION
The ADA itself does not define what constitutes a record of a
substantially limiting impairment.27 However, the applicable interpretive
regulations indicate that this aspect of the ADA's disability definition28 was
intended to prevent discrimination against persons with a history of
disability. 29 Thus, in order to claim the protection of the record of disability
provision,30 an individual must have been classified (or misclassified)3 1 at
25. See generally Luke A. Sobota, Comment, Does Title III of the Americans With Disabilities
Act Regulate Insurance?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 243 (1999) ("In the face of the ADA's textual
ambiguity, courts have developed competing interpretations of the ADA.").
26. See generally EEOC v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 2d 277, 291-92 (M.D.N.C. 2003)
("Ultimately, the determination of 'whether a particular form of assistance would be required as a
reasonable accommodation must be determined on an individualized, case by case basis."') (internal
bracketing and ellipses omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2005)); Bates v. United
Parcel Serv., 204 F.R.D. 440, 445 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("The ADA requires individualized analyses
when determining what accommodations are required under the ADA and whether a particular
individual even qualifies for protection under the ADA.").
27. See Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998); Burch v. Coca-Cola
Co., 119 F.3d 305, 321 (5th Cir. 1997). One court has observed that "[diefining 'record of
impairment' is difficult." Lloyd v. E. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 232 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (N.D.
Ohio 2002).
28. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is the federal agency charged
with responsibility for administering the ADA. See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 9 n.4
(1st Cir. 1999). Pursuant to that responsibility, the EEOC has "issued regulations and interpretive
guidelines to provide additional guidance regarding the proper interpretation of the term 'disability'
and other parts of the ADA." EEOC v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 577, 583 n.7 (D. Md.
2002). While the regulations are not binding, courts typically accord them "great deference" when
interpreting the ADA. See Rivera v. Apple Indus. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 n.5 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (quoting Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1999)).
29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2006); Gallegos v. Swift & Co., 237 F.R.D. 633, 643 (D. Colo.
2006); Couts v. Beaulieu Group, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Phillips v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1286 (S.D. Ala. 1999); Cribs v. City of Altamonte Springs,
11 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1462, 1465 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
30. Individuals need not invoke the record of disability provision if they are currently disabled.
See Johnson v. Lehigh County, I I Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 269, 270-71 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(indicating that an individual who is actually disabled within the meaning of the ADA "need not
additionally establish that she has a record of an impairment .... ); cf. Taliaferro v. Assocs. Corp.
of N. Am., 112 F. Supp. 2d 483, 491 (D.S.C. 1999) ("The ADA describes three types of disability,
any one of which can trigger the statute's protections."), af'd, 229 F.3d 1144 (4th Cir. 2000).
However, individuals often claim protection under both the actual and record of disability prongs of
some point in the past as having an impairment that constitutes an actual
disability within the meaning of the Act 32-that is, an impairment that
substantially limited one or more of the individual's major life activities.33
The principal premise underlying the record of disability provision is
that individuals who have recovered or are recovering from substantially
limiting impairments may be subjected to discrimination based on their
medical histories, 34 even though they have no present impairment severe
enough to constitute an actual disability within the meaning of the ADA.35
But while these individuals may experience discrimination as the result of
the unfounded fears and prejudices of their employers and coworkers,36 and
the ADA's disability definition. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097,
1127 (N.D. Iowa 2002). See generally Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 862 (1st Cir.
1998) ("There is no reason [an] employee could not be protected under two prongs
simultaneously."), abrogated on other grounds by Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999).
31. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (2006) ("This provision also ensures that individuals
are not discriminated against because they have been misclassified as disabled."); Phillips, 78 F.
Supp. 2d at 1287 ("As the EEOC regulations recognize, as long as an employer relies upon a record
that classifies a person as having a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity, that person is considered disabled under the ADA-even if the classification was
erroneous.").
32. See Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A plaintiff
attempting to prove the existence of a 'record' of disability still must demonstrate that the recorded
impairment is a 'disability' within the meaning of the ADA."); Manz v. Gaffney, 200 F. Supp. 2d
207, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("A record sufficient to establish an ADA claim ... must document a
disability within the meaning of the ADA."), affd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 56 F.
App'x 50 (2d Cir. 2003); Hannah v. County of Cook, 30 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 117, at 539
(N.D. Il1. 2005) ("Because [the plaintiffs] past impairment failed to fall under the definition of
disability in § 12102(2)(A), she cannot sustain a claim under § 12102(2)(B).").
33. See Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999)
("Regardless of whether [an individual] is proceeding under a classification or a misclassification
theory, the record-of-impairment standard is satisfied only if she actually suffered a physical
impairment that substantially limited one or more of [her] major life activities."); Nuzum v. Ozark
Auto. Distribs., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 852, 860 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 2004) ("A record of a disability means
'a history of a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities."' (quoting Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998)), aff'd, 432 F.3d 839 (8th
Cir. 2005).
34. See Bailey v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002); Bizelli v. Amchem, 981
F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
35. See Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1382 (3d Cir. 1991) ("A person with a
record of impairment can still qualify as a handicapped individual even if that individual's
impairment does not presently limit one or more of that person's major life activities."); see also
Burkett v. U.S. Postal Serv., 32 F. Supp. 2d 877, 879 n.2 (N.D. W. Va. 1999) (observing that the
ADA's record of disability provision "protects people who have a history of a disability from
discrimination, whether or not they currently are substantially limited in a major life activity").
36. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[P]eople
who have recovered from previously disabling conditions (cancer or coronary disease, for
example) . . . may remain vulnerable to the fears and stereotypes of their employers."); see also
Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans With Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REv. 27,
112 (2000) ("[E]mployers all too often rely on generalizations or inaccurate stereotypes
about ... past impairments.").
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thus require protection from "garden variety" disparate treatment,37 they are
less likely to require affirmative accommodations from their employers in
order to be productive employees. 38 One court explained this distinction in
the following terms:
In ADA cases involving actual disabilities, as opposed
to . . . a history of a disability, it is usually true that the plaintiff
cannot perform the essential functions of the job without some kind
of reasonable accommodation. The opposite may often be true in
the case[] of ... historical disability; the plaintiff may be perfectly
able to perform the job without any accommodation, and the only
thing standing in the way may be the employer's preconceived
notions of disability.
39
III. THE VIEW THAT EMPLOYERS NEED NOT ACCOMMODATE INDIVIDUALS
WITH A RECORD OF DISABILITY
In Barnes v. Northwest Iowa Health Center,4 ° a federal district court in
the Eighth Circuit held that employers have no duty to accommodate
37. See Miller v. Heritage Prods., Inc., No. 1:02-CV-1345-DFH, 2004 WL 1087370, at *10 (S.D.
Ind. Apr. 21, 2004) ("The ADA prohibits disparate treatment against a 'qualified individual with a
disability.' That prohibition includes all three definitions [of] disability .... (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (2000))). In this regard, one court has observed that "the same discriminatory animus is
afoot whether the plaintiff is 'actually' disabled or only has a 'record of disability."' Martinez v.
Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1132 (N.D. Iowa 2002); see also Friedland, supra note 12,
at 186 (observing that the ADA's record of disability provision is "comprehensible" for the
"purposes of preventing pure discrimination") (emphasis added).
38. See Alison M. Barnes, The Americans With Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After
Casey Martin, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 67, 88 n.109 (2001) ("Unlike more typical ADA plaintiffs,
those with [a record of disability] do not need accommodation. Rather . . . they only need the
discrimination to stop."); see also Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions
of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
877, 896 n.97 (1997) ("Many qualified individuals with perceived disabilities or with a record of
impairment covered under the second and third prong of the definition of disability may not need an
accommodation .... ).
39. Dalton v. Subaru-lsuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1998) (parenthesis omitted);
see also Uranyi v. Multiplan Inc., 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (18 Am. Disabilities Cases)
248, 249 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2006) (describing an employee who "was no longer disabled" and thus
"did not require any accommodations to perform her duties"); McGowan, supra note 36,
at 158 ("Persons . . . who have a 'record of' a disability generally do not require reasonable
accommodations.").
40. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
individuals protected under the ADA's record of disability provision.4' The
plaintiff in Barnes suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, 42 an inflammatory
disease of the joints43 that the court described as a "chronic, permanent
condition" with alternating periods of flare-ups
44 and remission. 45
In the plaintiffs case, her condition was sufficiently severe that it
prevented her from working for a number of years.46 However, with the aid
of medication, the plaintiff was ultimately able to control her condition to
the point she felt capable of returning to work,47 even though she continued
to experience "episodic flare-ups" during which she apparently was unable
to care for herself.
48
Upon concluding that her illness was sufficiently controlled,49 the
plaintiff applied for and was offered employment in a nursing home.5 °
However, when a company doctor subsequently concluded that the duties of
the position the plaintiff had been offered might be beyond her capabilities,5
the nursing home revoked its offer without considering any possible
accommodations.52 The plaintiff then brought suit under the ADA alleging,
among other things, that the nursing home unlawfully discriminated against
her on the basis of her record of disability.53 The plaintiff moved for partial
summary judgment, seeking a determination that she had established a prima
facie case that the nursing home impermissibly failed to accommodate her
limitations.5 4
The court began its analysis by noting that the Eighth Circuit had not
squarely addressed whether a failure to accommodate claim can be
maintained by an individual protected only under the ADA's record of
disability provision.55 The court therefore relied by analogy on a prior
Eighth Circuit decision,56 Weber v. Strippit, Inc.,57 and other similar cases
41. Seeid. at 1090.
42. See id. at 1060.
43. See Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 2000).
44. Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
45. See id. at 1060n.1.
46. See id. at 1060.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1075; see also Moore, 221 F.3d at 948 ("Individuals with advanced rheumatoid
arthritis ... can be subject to 'flare-ups,' which result in temporary incapacitation.").
49. See generally Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999)
(observing that "serious, chronic conditions ... are not always perfectly controlled").
50. See Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
51. Seeid. at 1061.
52. See id. at 1060.
53. See id. at 1059.
54. See id. at 1059, 1063; cf Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600 (7th
Cir. 1998) (indicating that an employer may be required to accommodate "episodic flares [that]
were . . . part of [an individual's] disability").
55. See Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 n.17.
56. In Bizelli v. Parker Am-Chem, No. 98-3560, an Eighth Circuit case predating Barnes that was
[Vol. 35: 1, 2007] Disability History
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
holding that employees protected by the ADA because they are erroneously
perceived to be disabled58 are not entitled to reasonable accommodations.5 9
The Barnes court concluded that these perceived disability cases
effectively hold that an employer's alleged failure to accommodate will not
support an ADA claim unless the individual seeking the accommodation is
actually disabled,6 ° in part because individuals with no actual disability
purportedly need no accommodation. 61 The court reasoned that individuals
settled before a ruling was issued, the EEOC apparently submitted an amicus brief asserting that
"restrictions growing from an individual's 'record of' cancer and cancer treatments must be
reasonably accommodated." Gilbert, supra note 24, at 673 & n.73 (describing the EEOC's position
in Bizelli). However, in a training manual prepared for use by its employees, the EEOC expressed
the seemingly contrary view (and the one ultimately embraced by the court in Barnes) that "[o]nly
persons who actually have a substantially limiting impairment are entitled to reasonable
accommodation under the ADA." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ADA CASE
STUDY TRAINING MANUAL, Case Study I, at 6 (1996); see also EEOC Official Gives Preview of
Guidance on Accommodations, ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL. (Thompson Publ'g Group, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.), July 1998, at 6 (discussing the EEOC's reluctance to take a formal position on
the issue).
57. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999).
58. The provision of the ADA extending protection to individuals who are "regarded as" having
a substantially limiting impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), is commonly known as the Act's
"perceived disability" provision. Burnett v. W. Res., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (D. Kan. 1996).
For the author's previous discussion of perceived disability discrimination generally, see Michael D.
Moberly, Perception or Reality?: Some Reflections on the Interpretation of Disability
Discrimination Statutes, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 345 (1996).
59. See Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 n.16 (citations omitted); see also Nuzum v. Ozark Auto.
Distribs., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 852, 870 n.16 (S.D. Iowa 2004) ("[l]t is well established in the
Eighth Circuit that the ADA does not impose upon an employer a duty to accommodate a 'regarded
as' disabled plaintiff."), affd, 432 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2005). However, whether employers must
provide accommodations in perceived disability cases "is a subject on which decisions are in
conflict." Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2004). Unlike the Eighth
Circuit, "the First and Third Circuits, as well as some district courts, have ruled that
accommodations must be made for employees regarded as disabled." Ammons-Lewis v. Metro.
Water Reclamation Dist., 16 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 386, 390 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citations
omitted). For the author's consideration of this unsettled issue, see Michael D. Moberly, Letting
Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 603 (1998).
60. See Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1090; cf Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 230 F. Supp. 2d 631,
645 n. 14 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("A number of courts have held that an employer need only accommodate
actual disabilities."), affd in part and rev 'd in part, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004).
61. See Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 ("A person without an actual disability would not need
any accommodation." (quoting Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 764 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997))).
The premise underlying this reasoning appears to be that "[i]f the [individual] were capable but the
employer perceived him as incapable, the Court would simply order the [employer] to recognize his
capability." Alderson v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 598 F. Supp. 49, 55 (W.D. Okla. 1984); see also
Leonard, supra note 19, at 39 ("Persons without actual disabling impairments do not need
accommodations to perform a job; rather, they need an injunction that prevents or repairs the injury
of employers relying on irrelevant factors.").
62protected under the Act's record of disability provision, like those
mistakenly perceived to be disabled,63 presumably are not currently suffering
from any substantially limiting impairments, 64 in which case they also
61
arguably need no accommodation.
Another federal district court reached essentially the same conclusion in
McLain v. Andersen Windows, Inc. 6 6 The plaintiff in McLain was a delivery
truck driver for the defendant employer.67 After aggravating a preexisting
knee injury, the plaintiff requested that he be assigned different job duties.68
When the employer failed to accommodate his request,69 the plaintiff
brought suit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), ° a state
statute prohibiting disability discrimination 71 that generally is analyzed in
the same manner as the ADA.72
The employer subsequently moved for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim.73 The employer argued that even if
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2000).
63. See Cook v. Cub Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 945, 952 (N.D. 111. 2000) ("Under the ADA, an
employee is 'regarded as disabled' if his impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity,
but the employer treats the employee as if he had such a disability."); McCollough v. Atlanta
Beverage Co., 929 F. Supp. 1489, 1498 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[Ain employer becomes subject to [the
perceived disability] prong of the statute only when he inaccurately 'perceives' as disabled, an
employee, who is not substantially impaired, and thereafter negatively stereotypes that employee's
abilities to the latter's detriment.").
64. See Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 n.17; cf Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d
1089, 1107 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("A plaintiff could show a record of a substantially limiting impairment
if he provides evidence that he faced such limitations in the past even if he is not presently
substantially limited."), rev'd on other grounds, 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001); Kohnke v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 5 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 345, 348 (N.D. IIl. 1995) ("A person may have a record
of a disability under the ADA and presently have no actual incapacity."); Gilbert, supra note 24, at
674 (observing that "the individual with a 'record of' substantial limitations may experience no
current limitations").
65. See, e.g., Ware v. Wyo. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 973 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D. Wyo. 1997)
(embracing the view that "accommodations would not be necessary for someone who did not
currently suffer from an impairment," such as "persons with a record of impairment"); Michelle
Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There Is Nothing Left for Proof. The Americans
With Disabilities Act's Disservice to Persons With Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 752
(2004) ("If the plaintiff is able to establish discrimination on the basis of a past disability that is no
longer substantially limiting a major life activity, then it is unclear why her employer would be
required to make a reasonable accommodation.").
66. 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (19 Am. Disabilities Cases) 306 (D. Minn. March 6, 2007).
67. See id. at 307.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.01-363A.41 (2004).
71. See Larson v. Koch Ref. Co., 920 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D. Minn. 1996).
72. See McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 309 (citing Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d
1020, 1023 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003)). In particular, the MHRA, like the ADA, requires employers to
provide reasonable accommodations for their employees' disabilities. See Burchett v. Target Corp.,
340 F.3d 510, 517 (8th Cir. 2003).
73. See McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 308.
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the plaintiff had a record of disability,74 as he was alleging,75 the employer
was not required to provide the plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation
because, by his own admission, his knee problems did not materially limit
any of his major life activities," and employers are only required to
accommodate individuals with actual disabilities.77
The court agreed with the employer, and entered summary judgment in
its favor on the plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim. 78 Relying on the
assertion in Weber v. Strippit, InC.79 that imposing a duty to accommodate in
perceived disability cases would lead to "bizarre results' 80 in which equally
(but not substantially) impaired-or even unimpaired '-individuals are
treated differently,82 the McLain court concluded that equally bizarre results
would occur if nondisabled employees with a disability history could
maintain reasonable accommodation claims.83  For example, if two
employees had the same non-disabling impairment, but one had a history of
74. Like the ADA, the MHRA prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual
"who has an actual disability," as well as one with "a record of disability." Id. at 309; see also
Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (D. Minn. 1989) ("The Minnesota Human Rights
Act also proscribes discrimination based on a 'record of... impairment."' (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 363A.03 subdiv. 12(2) (2004))).
75. See McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 308.
76. See id.; cf Nichols v. ABB DE, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (E.D. Mo. 2004) ("[T]he
Court ... cannot allow a reasonable accommodation claim to go forward because (the plaintiff] is
not substantially limited in a major life activity.").
77. See McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 308. Under some circumstances, a knee injury
presumably could support an actual disability claim under the ADA. See Desai v. Tire Kingdom,
Inc., 944 F. Supp. 876, 880 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting the contention that "a knee injury is not an
impairment that could qualify as limiting any major life activity to a significant degree"). However,
the McLain plaintiff's knee injury resulted in only a "three percent permanent disability," and he
conceded that this relatively modest impairment did not "materially limit a major life activity."
McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 308; cf Dodgens v Kent Mfg. Co., 955 F. Supp. 560, 564
(D.S.C. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs knee injury did not substantially limit his major life
activities where "his disability rating [was] only fifteen percent").
78. See McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 309.
79. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 916.
81. The plaintiff in a perceived disability case may "have no actual impairment at all, but be
treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting impairment." Mclnnis v. Alamo Cmty.
Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Jones v. OfficeMax, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 957,
962 (D. Utah 1999) ("A person is a disabled person under the ADA, among other ways, when that
person is not impaired, but is perceived as having a disability.").
82. See McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 308 (citing Weber, 186 F.3d at 916). The Weber
court explained that imposing a duty to accommodate in perceived disability cases would "create a
disparity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to
reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of their employers' misperceptions, a
right to reasonable accommodations no more limited than those afforded actually disabled
employees." Weber, 186 F.3d at 917.
83. McLain, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 309.
disability while the other did not, it would be illogical to require the
employer to accommodate the first employee's impairment but not the
second employee's identical impairment.
8 4
The Barnes and McLain courts are not alone in drawing this analogy
between the ADA's perceived disability and record of disability
provisions.85 In Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,86 for example,
the court observed that the analysis in the perceived disability cases relied
upon in Barnes87 essentially compels the conclusion that an individual
"cannot base a failure to accommodate claim on being regarded as having,
or having a record of, an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity.'88
Several other courts have held that employers need not accommodate
individuals with a record of disability.89 In Keck v. New York State Office of
Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Services,9° for example, the plaintiff suffered
various health problems stemming from her sensitivity to tobacco smoke and
perfume. 91 After allegedly being forced to take an indefinite leave of
absence to avoid exposure to those irritants,92 the plaintiff brought suit
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that
perceived disability cases and record of disability cases involve "similar considerations"); Davidson
v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing that the ADA's "record of
impairment" provision "is a close sibling to the 'perceived impairment' provision"); see also
Comman v. N.P. Dodge Mgmt. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1072 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that an
individual "may be classified as a person with a disability through an analysis which bridges the
'record of' and 'regarded as' prongs of the definition of a disabled person").
86. 230 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D. Pa. 2002), ajd in part and rev'd in part, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir.
2004). For a prior discussion of the Williams case, see Maire E. Donovan, How Bizarre?: The Third
Circuit's Analysis of the Requirement of Reasonable Accommodation for "Regarded As " Disabled
Employees Under the ADA in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, 50
VILL. L. REv. 1213 (2005).
87. Both Barnes and Williams cited Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999),
Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1999), and Newberry v. East Texas State
University, 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998). See Barnes v. Nw. Iowa Health Ctr., 238 F. Supp. 2d
1053, 1090 n.16 (N.D. Iowa 2002); Williams, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 645 n.14.
88. Williams, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 645 n.14 (emphasis added); cf Fotos v. Internet Commerce
Express, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 212, 216 (D.N.H. 2001) (holding that the reasoning in a perceived
disability case "applies equally to the . . . 'record of' prong[] of the definition").
89. See, e.g., Avery v. U.S. Postal Serv., 5 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 456, at 1511 (6th Cir.
1994) (describing lower court's holding that "an employer has no duty to accommodate a person
with a history of handicaps"); cf Herschaft v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, No. 00 CV 2748(CBA), 2001
WL 940923, at *3 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) ("Plaintiff... assert[s] that he has a 'record' of a
disability under the ADA .... If plaintiff is no longer disabled ... plaintiff would not need any
special accommodation.") (involving alleged discrimination in the provision of public services,
rather than employment), affd, 37 F. App'x 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
90. 10 F. Supp. 2d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
91. See id. at 196.
92. Being placed on involuntary leave "can be seen as an adverse action" potentially actionable
under federal employment discrimination law. Leeker v. Gill Studios, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1267,
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against her employer for disability discrimination,9 3 arguing that she was
protected under all three prongs of the ADA's disability definition.94
However, because the plaintiff effectively was arguing only that the
employer failed to accommodate her condition,95 the court concluded that
her ADA claim was cognizable, if at all,96 only if she suffered from an actual
disability. 97 The court explained:
[W]ith regard to the definitions of disability as being "regarded" as
having a disability or having a "record" of such a disability . . .
plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that she was fired because of her
disability .... [T]here clearly can be no claim of discrimination
based on failure to accommodate a disability where there is no
actual disability.
98
A similar result was reached in Sharma v. Cook Couny.99 The plaintiff
in Sharma was a hospital anesthesiologist who took an extended leave of
1272 (D. Kan. 1998); see also Waugaman v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., No. 00 C 2581, 2002 WL
472278, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002) (asserting that "a forced medical leave constitutes an adverse
employment action").
93. See Keck, 10 F. Supp. 2dat 195-96.
94. See id. at 198; ef EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 824, 827 (N.D. Ind. 1998) ("To be
'disabled' under the ADA, [an individual] must fall within one of the three potential categories of
disability set forth under the Act.").
95. See Keck, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 198 ("Plaintiff has made no showing that she was discriminated
against because of how she was regarded or because of her record of disability. Rather, she was not
allowed to return to work because of her unwillingness to work under certain conditions.").
96. Although the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact with
respect to whether she suffered from an actual disability, the court ultimately awarded summary
judgment to the employer because the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified to perform her job. See
id. at 200-02; cf Ragan v. Jeffboat, LLC, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1066 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (observing
that "only a 'qualified individual' with a disability is entitled to an accommodation"); Testerman v.
Chrysler Corp., 12 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 2, at 11 (D. Del. 1998) ("The ADA requires, in
order to state a claim for discrimination, an individual must demonstrate not only that he was
disabled but also that he was qualified for the job at issue." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000))).
97. See Keck, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 198 ("[E]ven if plaintiff could establish disability under [the
'record of' and 'regarded as'] provisions . . . she would not establish the basis for an ADA
[reasonable accommodation] claim."); cf Godron v. Hillsborough County, 18 Nat'l Disability L.
Rep. (LRP) 11, at 43 n.3 (D.N.H. 2000) ("Because [the plaintiff] argues that he requires an
accommodation for his condition ... he presumably is claiming that he presently suffers from an
actual impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.").
98. Keck, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But see Genthe v.
Quebecor World Lincoln, Inc., No. 4:02CV3060, 2002 WL 31833278, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2002)
(rejecting the contention that an individual's "demand for reasonable accommodation makes it clear
that he is pursuing ... an [actual] disability claim as opposed to a perceived or record of disability
claim") (internal quotation marks and bracketing omitted).
99. No. 01 C 432, 2003 WL 22757753 (N.D. 111. Nov. 19, 2003).
absence after being diagnosed with ovarian cancer.'00 When her cancer went
into remission after nearly four years of treatment, 10 ' the plaintiff attempted
to resume active employment." 2 Assuming, perhaps, that the ADA did not
require it to hold the plaintiffs job open for such an extended period of
time,'0 3 the hospital refused to reinstate her to her former position.'04
The plaintiff then brought suit under the ADA, 05 alleging, among other
things, that the hospital impeded her ability to demonstrate her current
clinical competence as an anesthesiologist.0 6 While finding that the plaintiff
raised a genuine issue of fact on some of her claims, 0 7 the court rejected her
claim that the hospital failed to provide her with a reasonable
accommodation. 10 8 Noting that the plaintiff's cancer was in remission at the
time of her attempted return to work, 0 9 the court held that an employer's
duty to accommodate applies only to individuals with current disabilities.°"0
The issue was also recently addressed in Kim v. Potter."' The plaintiff
in Kim was employed by the United States Postal Service." 2 After he was
involved in an automobile accident that resulted in permanent physical and
cognitive impairments, the Postal Service reassigned him from a window
clerk position to a permanent light duty position in its mail processing
department.' The reassignment had been requested by the plaintiff, 1 4 and
100. See id. at * 1.
101. The plaintiffs apparent inability to work while undergoing extended treatment undoubtedly
was sufficient to bring her within .the protection of the ADA's record of disability provision. See
McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 2001) (indicating that an individual is protected
under the provision if "at some point her impairment actually did substantially limit her ability to
work").
102. See Sharma, 2003 WL 22757753, at *1.
103. See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[R]easonable accommodation does
not require [an employer] to wait indefinitely for [an employee's] medical conditions to be
corrected, especially in light of the uncertainty of cure."), superseded by statute, Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, Title V, § 506, 106 Stat. 4360, 4428 (1992); Turco v.
Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1120, 1130 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("The law does not
impose upon employers the burden of awaiting uncertain results of a disabled employee's treatment
program.").
104. Sharma, 2003 WL 22757753, at *1.
105. Seeid.
106. See id. at *2.
107. Seeid. at*l-2.
108. See id. at *2.
109. See id. at *1. The plaintiff herself admitted she had no actual disability at the time of her
attempted return. See id. at *2.
110. See id.; cf Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 32 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000)
("An employer's duty to accommodate relates only to existing disabilities.").
111. 460 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (D. Haw. 2006).
112. See id. at 1196.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1203 (describing the plaintiffs "request for a light duty assignment" because he
"was unable to perform the duties of his original ... position as a result of his off-duty automobile
accident").
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reflected the Postal Service's usual treatment of employees unable to
perform their original duties due to nonwork-related injuries or medical
conditions. '
Several years later, the Postal Service's partial automation of its mail
processing and distribution operations reduced the amount of work available
to employees working in light duty positions.' 16 When the Postal Service
failed to honor the plaintiffs request to maintain a full work schedule,"'7 he
brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act," 8 which prohibits federal
employers, including the Postal Service,' 9 from discriminating against
individuals with disabilities. 20
Noting that regular employees with no physical restrictions on their
ability to work' 2' continued to be assigned overtime work despite the
automation, 122 the plaintiff asserted that the Postal Service must have
115. See id. at 1196; see also Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216, 1217 n.I (6th Cir. 1984) ("In the
Postal Service, 'light duty' is a status in which an employee, injured or otherwise incapable of
performing his or her usual duties, is placed in a job not requiring the same work capacity as before
the injury or disability.").
116. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1196. See generally Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 2 F.3d 408, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he overall pace and course of extending Postal Service
automation . . . generally fall[s] within the Postal Service's exclusive authority over management
decisions.").
117. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 (discussing the plaintiff's contention that he ultimately
"retired involuntarily ... because he was not returned to a full work schedule"); cf Thompson v.
Runyon, 4 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 188, 210 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (observing that "the postal
service has no obligation to provide work" to "a light duty employee"), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir.
1995).
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-97 (2000). The Rehabilitation Act is often referred to as the ADA's
"precursor." See, e.g., Rogers v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir.
1999), abrogated by Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Darian v. Univ. of Mass. Boston, 980
F. Supp. 77, 84 (D. Mass. 1997). The two acts are "similar in purpose," in that both "prohibit
discrimination against the disabled." McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453,
459 (6th Cir. 1997). The principal difference "is that coverage under the Rehabilitation Act is
limited to entities receiving federal financial assistance, while the ADA's reach extends to purely
private entities." Id. at 460.
119. The Postal Service is not directly subject to the employment discrimination prohibitions of
the ADA. See Henrickson v. Potter, 327 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2003); Garvin v. Potter, 367 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, the Rehabilitation Act "incorporates the substantive
standards" of the ADA by reference. Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 791(g)).
120. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the
Rehabilitation Act "is applicable only to federal employers, such as the Postal Service, and
employers who receive federal funding," and that the Act prohibits such employers "from
discriminating against persons with disabilities in matters of hiring, placement or advancement");
see also DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 418 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The Rehabilitation Act prohibits the
United States Postal Service from discriminating against their employees on the basis of a
disability.").
121. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
122. See id. at 1197, 1203.
reduced his work hours "because of his disability," '123 rather than due to a
purported lack of available work. 124 The plaintiff also alleged that in failing
to assign him to another position in which more work would be available,
125
the Postal Service unlawfully failed to accommodate his disability.
t2 6
The court first addressed whether the plaintiff was "disabled" for
purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act. 127 The court held that the plaintiff did not suffer from a
current disability because his impairments did not substantially limit any of
his major life activities. 128 However, the plaintiff established the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether he had a record of
disability, 129 because he was hospitalized immediately after the automobile
123. Id. at 1197; cf Johnson v. Kmart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1053 (1lth Cir. 2001) ("The
gravamen of a disability-based discrimination claim is that an individual has been treated less
favorably because of her disability.").
124. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1197; cf Walsh v. NBC, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 153,
155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that the fact that some employees "continued to work overtime" while
the employer was claiming there had been a "decline in the amount of... work available" might be
"indicative of an intent by [the employer] to discriminate").
125. The Postal Service is organized into separate postal districts, each of which "makes its own
decision regarding employee transfers." Jordan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 379 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir.
2004). These districts occasionally use "Reasonable Accommodation Committees" to determine
"whether an employee qualifies for accommodation under the Rehab[ilitation] Act and ... what
accommodation is required, including transfer or reassignment." Claybome v. Potter, 448 F. Supp.
2d 185, 188 (D.D.C. 2006); see, e.g., Shattuck v. Potter, 441 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D. Me. 2006)
("[T]he Maine District Reasonable Accommodation Committee ... is responsible for considering,
recommending, and/or denying requests for reasonable accommodations."). In Kim, such a
committee reviewed the plaintiffs request for reassignment "to determine whether there were other
jobs ... that [he] could perform," 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1197, but apparently concluded that there were
no such positions available. See id. at 1205 (discussing the Postal Service's evidence that the
plaintiff's "physical impairments prevent[ed] him from performing available work").
126. See Jordan, 379 F.3d at 1201 n.8. Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act "do more than
merely prohibit disparate treatment; they also impose an affirmative duty on employers to offer a
'reasonable accommodation' to a disabled employee." Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355
F.3d 6, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000)). In addition, "the
Rehabilitation Act was amended effective October 29, 1992, to incorporate ... the ADA's express
provision for reassignment as a potential form of reasonable accommodation." Woodman v.
Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1339 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997).
127. Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; cf Thompson v. Runyon, 4 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA)
188, 219 (W.D. Mo. 1994) ("The first element that [a] plaintiff must prove to make a prima facie
case of handicap discrimination is that she is a handicapped individual within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act."), affd, 46 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 1995).
128. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 ("[N]o reasonable finder of fact could conclude that [the
plaintiff] is currently substantially limited in a major life activity .... ).
129. See id. at 1201-03. Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act protects persons with a record of a
substantially limiting impairment. See Fitzgerald v. Alleghany Corp., 904 F. Supp. 223, 229 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act and the ADA provide a ... three-pronged
definition of disability" similar in coverage to the New York Human Rights Law, which "covers
individuals who have an actual impairment, have a record of an impairment, or are regarded as
having an impairment" (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Rehabilitation Act definition) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (ADA definition))), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Johnson Controls World
[Vol. 35: 1, 2007] Disability History
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
accident 130 (and presumably "could not perform one or more major life
activities" during that time),' 3' and the impairments he suffered in the
accident were permanent in nature. .32 Thus, the Postal Service was not
entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff was "not
'disabled' within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act."'
133
The court also held that the reduction in the plaintiffs hours "while
other, non-disabled, employees continued to receive overtime hours" was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. 134  However, the court found that the Postal Service's partial
automation of its operations constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for reducing the plaintiffs hours. 135 Because the plaintiff admitted he
Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
130. The court indicated that the plaintiff's "hospitalization, by itself, would not be enough to
establish a record of a disability because, at most, [he] was substantially limited in one or more
major life activities for less than two months." Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (citations omitted); cf
Taylor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting "the nonsensical
proposition that any hospital stay is sufficient to evidence a 'record of impairment'); Szymanska v.
Abbott Labs., 3 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 748, 761 (N.D. 111. 1994) ("[P]ast hospitalization does
not, without more, indicate any impairment or history of impairment that substantially limits any of
[an individual's] major life activities.").
131. Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1202; see also Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., I F. Supp. 2d 1306,
1309 (D. Utah 1998) (observing that "most people who are confined to a hospital are substantially
limited in their major life activities during their hospital stay"), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir.
1999); see, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Of
course, every instance of hospitalization is disabling in the sense that one cannot go to work.").
132. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 ("[The plaintiffs] impairments did not completely
disappear upon his discharge from the hospital .... Instead, [he] alleges that he continues to suffer
impairments to the present day .... "). Because the duration of an impairment is a relevant
consideration in determining whether an individual is statutorily disabled, the court concluded that it
was permissible to consider the permanent nature of the plaintiffs impairments in conjunction with
his initial hospitalization in determining whether he was protected under the Rehabilitation Act's
record of disability provision. See id. at 1202-03 & n.9; cf Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Davidson
Acad., 846 F. Supp. 611, 617-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) ("[The plaintiffs] hospitalization.., as well as
her on-going need to receive medication and weekly medical treatment, is sufficient to establish the
severity of her affliction and a record of impairment of one or more of [her] major life activities.").
133. Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; cf Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
[Rehabilitation] Act recognizes that discrimination also occurs against those who at one time had a
disabling condition.").
134. Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; cf Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2004) ("In
disparate treatment cases, a similarly situated disabled individual is treated differently because of his
disability than less- or non-disabled individuals.").
135. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 ("The USPS has proffered a non-discriminatory
reason- increased automation-for the decrease in [the plaintiffs] hours."); cf Hayes v. Potter, No.
C-02-0437 VRW, 2005 WL 1876070, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005) (discussing the employer's
"burden of 'articulat[ing] a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision,' such
as decreasing light duty hours" (quoting Wallis v. J R Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1994))).
could not perform regular Postal Service work,'36 he was unable to show that
the Postal Service's stated reason for reducing his hours was a pretext for
disability discrimination.'37 The court therefore awarded summary judgment
to the Postal Service on the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim.'38
This left only the plaintiff s failure to accommodate claim, 3 9 which the
court perceived to be the primary focus of his case in any event. 4 °
However, the court noted that courts in several ADA cases have held that
failure to accommodate claims can only be maintained by individuals who
are "currently substantially limited in a major life activity.'' 14 ' Relying
primarily on those cases, 142 the Kim court held that even if an ADA or
Rehabilitation Act plaintiff "can prove that he has a 'record of' a disability
or that he is 'regarded as' being disabled, he cannot succeed on a reasonable
accommodation claim."'143  Thus, without addressing the Postal Service's
136. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 ("There is no doubt that the USPS believed [the plaintiff]
to be incapable of performing standard USPS work because of [his] physical impairments-in fact,
[he] specifically asked for Light Duty work because of these physical impairments, and ... admits
that he was unable to perform [regular] work because of his accident.").
137. The plaintiff "point[ed] to the fact that the USPS continued to give [regular] [e]mployees
overtime work while claiming to have no work for Light Duty employees as evidence of pretext."
Id. at 1205. However, the court held that "the fact that other employees received overtime hours
while sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination-[was] insufficient to demonstrate
that the USPS's proferred nondiscriminatory reason for reducing [the plaintiffs] hours was
pretextual." Id. at 1204. The court explained:
[T]he fact that other employees received overtime hours does not help [the
plaintiff], because there is no evidence to suggest that [he] was capable of performing
[that] work .... Because [he] cannot perform the work of [those other] employees, he is
not similarly situated to them; therefore, the fact that [they] were given overtime work is
not probative of pretext.
Id. at 1206 (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 1206-07; cf Thompson v. Runyon, 4 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 188, 229
(W.D. Mo. 1994) ("Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
proferred reason for giving a limited duty employee available work rather than a light duty employee
is pretextual."), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 1995).
139. The court noted that the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim was "separate from his claim for
failure to accommodate." Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.8; see also Peebles, 354 F.3d at 766 ("The
failure to make reasonable accommodations in the employment of a disabled employee is a separate
form of prohibited discrimination.").
140. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.8 ("[The plaintiff's] First Amended Complaint seems to
center on the USPS's alleged failure to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. Whether
his First Amended Complaint also sets forth a claim for discrimination is not entirely clear, but the
court assumes for purposes of this order that the Complaint does, in fact, allege a claim for
discrimination (based on the reduction of his hours) separate from his claim for failure to
accommodate.").
141. Id. (citations omitted).
142. See generally Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("[C]ases involving the
ADA are precedent for those involving the Rehabilitation Act."); Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he case law construing the ADA generally pertains
equally to claims under the Rehabilitation Act.").
143. Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.8; cf Smith v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 33 Nat'l
Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 224, at 1042 n.8 (E.D. La. 2006) ("If an individual is not actually
disabled but only has a history of a disability or is regarded as disabled, they may be unable to assert
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ability to accommodate the plaintiffs limitations, 144 the court awarded
summary judgment to the Postal Service on his failure to accommodate
claim. 145
IV. THE VIEW THAT EMPLOYERS MUST ACCOMMODATE INDIVIDUALS
WITH A RECORD OF DISABILITY
In Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd.,146 the Seventh Circuit observed
that ADA protection may extend to individuals who need some type of
accommodation despite having no present impairment substantial enough to
constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 47 The court cited as
an example an individual with a recurring condition 4 1 who might be able to
claim ADA protection based (in part) on a prior hospitalization 149 and, in
turn, be entitled to reasonable accommodation for any limitations resulting
from a recurrence of the condition.
150
a claim based on a failure to accommodate.").
144. Ordinarily, "[i]f the issue of reasonable accommodation is raised, the [employer] must then
be prepared to make a ... showing that accommodation cannot reasonably be made ...." Prewitt v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981); cf Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20 ("To assert a
claim for failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, [the plaintiff] would have to
establish ... that, despite her employer's knowledge of her disability, the employer did not offer a
reasonable accommodation for the disability.").
145. See Kim, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 ("The USPS need not offer [the plaintiff] a reasonable
accommodation because he is not presently substantially limited in a major life activity."); cf
Thompson v. Potter, 32 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 80, at 356 (S.D. Ohio 2006) ("Even
assuming there was any reasonable accommodation that the Postal Service could have made for [the
plaintiff], because he was not actually disabled, he was not entitled to it.") (emphasis added).
146. 133 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1998).
147. See id. at 509; cf Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896 (N.D. Il1. 2002) ("The
reasonable accommodation provision includes nothing to suggest that it applies only to 'substantial'
limitations .... "). But see Friedland, supra note 12, at 186 (asserting that "accommodation should
only be required for those impairments that qualify as disabilities in their own right").
148. See generally Machamer v. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa., 10 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1498,
1500 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("A 'record of [a substantially limiting] impairment' means a 'history' of the
condition such as a chronic recurrence of an ailment." (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987))).
149. See EEOC v. Automatic Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006 (D. Minn. 2001) ("[T]he law
is clear that mere hospitalization is insufficient to establish a record of disability.").
150. See Davidson, 133 F.3d at 509 n.6; see also Radimecky v. Mercy Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr.,
21 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 217, at 1168 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("[E]vidence of a history of a
substantially limiting impairment could . . . permit[] the plaintiff to demand reasonable
accommodations to ongoing or recurrent limitations."). See generally Cramer v. Florida., 885 F.
Supp. 1545, 1551 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (indicating that "the purpose of the ADA is to protect those
individuals who have some permanent or chronic disability") (emphasis added), affd, 117 F.3d
1258 (1l th Cir. 1997).
While the Seventh Circuit did not actually decide the issue, 5' other
courts have cited Davidson for the proposition that employers have a duty to
provide reasonable accommodations "not only to a qualified individual with
an actual disability, but also to a qualified individual with a record of
disability."'5 2  In Mack v. Great Dane Trailers,'" for example, a federal
district court in the Seventh Circuit relied on Davidson in concluding that
the ADA not only prohibits intentional discrimination against individuals
with a record of a substantially limiting impairment, 1 4 but also may require
employers to accommodate such individuals' work-related limitations,'5 5
even if their impairments are no longer severe enough to constitute actual
disabilities within the meaning of the Act.
15 6
The analysis in these cases suggests that the contrary conclusion reached
in cases such as Barnes v. Northwest Iowa Health Center' may have been
based on the implicit but mistaken assumption that the ADA's record of
disability provision only protects individuals who have fully recovered from
151. See Davidson, 133 F.3d at 509 n.6 ("The extent to which [an employer] may [be] obligated to
accommodate [an individual] based solely on any record of impairment is not before us. That and
any other questions raised by this provision of the statute are open for exploration on remand.").
152. Ragan v. Jeftboat, LLC, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1069 n.1 I (S.D. Ind. 2001) (citing Davidson,
133 F.3d at 509); see also Hawkins v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 83 F. Supp. 2d 987, 998 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
("The court in Davidson stated that [the record of disability provision] may extend the definition of
disabled 'to those who may require some sort of accommodation from their employer,
notwithstanding their inability to demonstrate a present impairment that is substantial enough to
qualify as disabling under the ADA."' (quoting Davidson, 133 F.3d at 509)).
153. 12 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 86 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 308
F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2002).
154. See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 775 (E.D. Tex. 1996) ("[W]hen
an employer knows an employee has a record of past disability or when an employer thinks an
employee has a record of past disability, and the employer treats the employee adversely because of
this record, the ADA is violated."); see also Cribs v. City of Altamonte Springs, II Am. Disabilities
Cases (BNA) 1462, 1465 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ("The intent of [the record of disability] provision is to
ensure that people are not discriminated against because of a history of a disability.").
155. The Seventh Circuit has observed that "[t]o 'accommodate' a disability is to make some
change that will enable the disabled person to work." Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, an employer's duty to accommodate "only extends
to job-related adjustments or modifications." Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F.
Supp. 2d 993, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2000); see also Burnett v. W. Res., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1349, 1358 (D.
Kan. 1996) ("Only job-related adjustments or modifications, which enable an individual to perform
the duties of a particular job, are required as reasonable accommodations.").
156. See Mack, 12 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 93 (citing Davidson, 133 F.3d at 509); cf
Zwygart v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197 n.2 (D. Kan. 2006) (describing the
plaintiff's assertion that he had a "record of disability" for which his employer failed "to make an
accommodation" as "elements one and two of a cognizable claim under the ADA").
157. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Iowa 2002). Like the Seventh Circuit in Davidson, the Barnes
court concluded that an employer may be required to accommodate subsequent limitations that
"arise out of' a disabling impairment, even if those limitations "are not themselves substantially
limiting." Id. at 1091 n. 17. However, unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Barnes court implied that such
a duty would exist only if the impairment is otherwise substantially limiting-that is, only if the
impairment constituted an actual disability. See id.
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a substantially limiting impairment. 58  Those individuals arguably would
need no accommodation from their employers because they presumably
have no impairment for an employer to accommodate. 159
The principal difficulty with this reasoning is that the ADA's record of
disability provision also protects individuals with previously disabling
impairments from which they have only partially recovered. 60  The
provision thus reflects the fact that impairments that are no longer
sufficiently severe to constitute actual disabilities within the meaning of the
ADA 161 may nevertheless have long term effects on the individuals suffering
from them. 
62
For example, an individual may experience a substantially limiting
episode of major depression from which he or she recovers completely.
Another individual may recover from such an episode only partially, but
enough that his or her depression is no longer substantially limiting. Both of
158. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 498-99 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the record of disability provision "plainly covers a person who previously
had a serious ... impairment that has since been completely cured"); Hannah v. County of Cook, 30
Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 117, at 539 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that the record of disability
provision "protects individuals who previously had impairments that qualified as disabilities, but no
longer have the impairment"); Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, 2 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1318,
1322 (D.N.J. 1993) (observing that the record of disability provision "protects those individuals who
have recovered from a disability.").
159. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1997) ("A person whose
condition is entirely controlled will not need any . . . accommodation under the Act: there is no
problem to accommodate."); cf. Jacobs v. Potter, No. 99-T-1357-N, 2005 WL 3690546, at *4 (M.D.
Ala. Mar. 16, 2005) ("The [statutory] language presumes that the employee has an actual limitation
that requires some type of accommodation.").
160. See Bailey v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that the record
of disability provision protects "those who have recovered or are recovering from substantially
limiting impairments") (emphasis added); Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130,
139 (D. Mass. 1998) ("The implementing regulations establish that an employee who has previously
had a disabling impairment from which he has recovered in whole or in part has a record of a
disability." (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2005))).
161. See generally Thompson v. Eaton Corp., 25 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 39, at 180
(W.D. Wis. 2002) (indicating that the ADA's record of disability provision protects individuals who
are "no longer [actually disabled] because their impairment has become less severe or no longer
exists"); Sweet v. Elec. Data Sys., Inc., 5 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 853, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(observing that the record of disability provision protects an individual who "had once been
disabled, but is no longer").
162. See Downs, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 139. Indeed, some courts have held that in order to constitute a
record of disability, the impairment of which an individual has a record "must be 'permanent or
long-term."' Lloyd v. City of E. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 232 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998)); cf.
McWilliams v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (concluding that an
individual claiming protection on the basis of a record of disability must have "an impairment of a
continuing nature").
these individuals would have a record of a substantially limiting
impairment-major depression. 163
In this regard, individuals with a record of disability may have certain
lingering or recurring impairments that are not substantially limiting within
the meaning of the ADA,' 64 but that nevertheless require accommodation in
order for them to be productive employees. 165 In Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic
Corp.,166 for example, the plaintiffs cancer was in remission during the time
period at issue in the litigation,167 and thus may not have constituted an
actual disability under the ADA.1 68  However, the plaintiff continued to
suffer fatigue and other residual side effects from the treatment she
received.169 She sought an accommodation of those residual limitations 170 in
the form of a transfer to a facility located closer to her home because the
"shorter commute would allow her to sleep longer."' 171 As an individual with
163. Peggy R. Mastroianni & Carol R. Miaskoff, Coverage of Psychiatric Disorders Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 723, 736 n.51 (1997).
164. See Gilbert, supra note 24, at 674 (noting that "the individual with a 'record of substantial
limitations may ...have limitations which wax and wane or remit and reoccur"); cf Henry v.
Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1967) (observing that a "person who has recovered from a prior
disability [may] subsequently suffer[] a relapse").
165. See Gilbert, supra note 24, at 674-75 ("Many [employees with a record of disability] may
require [a reasonable accommodation] for a productive return to work. For example, an individual
with a history of carpal tunnel which substantially limited performance of manual tasks may require
accommodation to prevent the recurrence of the condition.").
166. 13 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 189, at 819 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
167. See id. at 819, 823.
168. See, e.g., Alderdice v. Am. Health Holding, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 856, 863-64 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (holding that cancer in remission at the time of the plaintiffs termination was not
"substantially limiting," as was required in order for her to establish a claim under the actual
disability prong of the ADA).
169. See Vendetta, 13 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. at 819, 823. See generally Taylor v. Phoenixville
Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Medical treatments for many chronic conditions
can in some instances themselves create limitations.").
170. Because employers are only required to accommodate the known limitations of an individual
claiming protection under the ADA, such an individual ordinarily "must request reasonable
accommodation from an employer in order for the employer's duty to reasonably accommodate to be
triggered." Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see
also Ferry v. Roosevelt Bank, 883 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Mo. 1995) ("[E]mployers are obligated to
make reasonable accommodations only to the 'known' physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability. Thus, the duty to accommodate is generally triggered by a
request from the applicant for employment or an employee." (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at
65 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 347)).
171. Vendetta, 13 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. at 820; cf Salmon v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp.
2d 1157, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (discussing another employee's contention that her employer "failed
to accommodate her disability by transferring her to a [facility] which afforded her a shorter
commute"). But see Laresca v. AT&T, 161 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333-34 (D.N.J. 2001) ("A number of
courts have held that commuting to and from work is not part of the work environment that an
employer is required to reasonably accommodate." (citing Salmon, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 and other
cases).
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a record of disability,172 the plaintiff may have been entitled to such an
accommodation173 under the reasoning of Davidson and its progeny.
174
In Mark v. Burke Rehabilitation Hospital,'7 5 another federal district
court reached essentially the same conclusion under somewhat similar
circumstances. The plaintiff in Mark was diagnosed with cancer not long
after being hired as a part-time attending physician at the defendant's
hospital. 76  The plaintiffs treatment regimen involved a combination of
surgery and chemotherapy177 -a common means of treating the disease178
that often can (and arguably must) 7 9 be accommodated by an employer
through the provision of temporary or intermittent leave. 180
The dispute in Mark arose when the plaintiff refused the hospital's
request that he postpone one of his chemotherapy treatments in order to fill
172. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 557, 573 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("Congress
unequivocally stated its intention to protect individuals with a record of cancer. Interpretive
guidelines to the ADA confirm the "record of' provision is intended to protect 'former cancer
patients from discrimination based on their prior medical history.' Further, the EEOC's Technical
Assistance Manual for the ADA confirms that the ADA 'protects people with a history of cancer'
even when their 'illnesses are either cured, controlled or in remission."') (citations omitted).
173. See generally Lyons v. Heritage House Rests., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 270, 273 (I1. 1982)
(observing that "recovered cancer victims . . . sometimes have experienced trouble readjusting to
employment because of their record of handicap"), superseded by statute, Illinois Human Rights
Act, 775 11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-101 (West 2007); Gilbert, supra note 24, at 675 ("[T]he
individual recovering from cancer may need reasonable accommodation to transition back to
work."). Although the Vendetta court itself found that the plaintiff had established the existence of
"a fact issue ... as to whether [the] failure to transfer her ... constituted a failure to accommodate
her disability," the court analyzed the case as one involving either an actual or a perceived disability,
rather than a record of disability. Vendetta, 13 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. at 823.
174. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[E]vidence of a
history of a substantially limiting impairment could constitute a disability under the statute,
permitting the plaintiff to demand reasonable accommodations to ongoing or recurrent limitations.");
see also Radimecky v. Mercy Health Care & Rehab. Ctr., 21 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. 217, at 1168
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying Davidson, 133 F.3d 499).
175. 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
176. Seeid. at 1157.
177. See id.
178. See Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 852 n.2 (8th Cir. 1979)
(referring to "the standard treatment for cancer-surgery, radiation and chemotherapy." (quoting
What the Health Quacks Are Peddling Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 21, 1976, at 45)).
179. See, e.g., Velente-Hook v. E. Plumas Health Care, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1094 (E.D. Cal.
2005) (rejecting the contention that an employer "'was not legally required' to grant [an employee] a
personal leave 'while she completed her chemotherapy."').
180. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mid-Continent Sec. Agency, 11 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 448, 451
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (describing an employee who "was able to perform the functions of his job so long
as he received time off to attend his weekly chemotherapy session"); cf Willis v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
No. 03 C 9185, 2004 WL 2033318, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2004) ("[An employee with cancer
may need intermittent leave for chemotherapy.").
in for another physician during her absence from work due to a vacation.' 81
Although other hospital physicians were ultimately able to cover for the
vacationing doctor,' 82  the hospital director terminated the plaintiffs
employment upon being apprised of his unwillingness to postpone his
medical treatment. 1
83
The plaintiff subsequently brought suit under the ADA,1 4 arguing that
the hospital unlawfully failed to accommodate his treatment schedule when
it instead terminated his employment.' 85 The hospital moved for summary
judgment.'86  Relying on the plaintiffs admission that his cancer was in
remission at the time of his termination, the hospital argued that the plaintiff
was not disabled.8 7 Further, the hospital argued that it had no duty to
accommodate the plaintiffs treatment schedule because it was his duty to
"request an accommodation and to work with the [hospital] in finding an
accommodation that was reasonable to both parties.' ' 8
The court agreed that the plaintiff did not suffer from an existing
disability. 8 9 However, the court concluded that as a former cancer patient,
the plaintiff was nevertheless disabled within the meaning of the ADA
because he had a record of a substantially limiting physical impairment,' 90
181. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 1157-58.
182. Seeid. at li58,1161n.i0.
183. See id. at 1158, 1162. In this regard, the director testified that once the plaintiff refused to
postpone his treatment, there was "no point in continuing his employment." Id. at 1] 62 (bracketing
omitted).
184. Seeid. at i157.
185. See id. at 1158; cf Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "a reasonable allowance of time for medical care and treatment may, in appropriate
circumstances, constitute a reasonable accommodation").
186. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 1158.
187. See id. at 1159.
188. Id. at 1162; cf Powers v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1114 (D. Kan. 2002)
("Plaintiff, by conceding she was not disabled, has essentially waived any claim that [the employer]
was required to accommodate her."). The hospital's argument undoubtedly was premised on the
proposition that an employer has "no duty to accommodate an employee if the employee is not
disabled under the ADA." Swain v. Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 858 (1 1th Cir.
1998); see, e.g., Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., No. 04-2388-RDR, 2006 WL 980741, at *7 (D. Kan.
Mar. 1, 2006) ("We do not believe the record in this case presents a genuine issue of fact as to
whether plaintiff had a record of disability as that term is defined for purposes of the
ADA .. . . Therefore, plaintiffs claim for failure to accommodate on the basis of a record of
disability may be dismissed.").
189. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 1159; cf EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181
F.3d 645, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that an employee receiving monthly chemotherapy
treatments that required him "to be away from the job for one to three days ... each month" did not
suffer from the type of "substantial limitation necessary to invoke 'disability' status under §
12102(2)(A)"); Kutka v. DMC Auto Transfer of Chi., Inc., 15 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 96, 102
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that "his immune deficiency condition caused by
his treatment for lymphoma qualiflied] him as having a disability under the ADA" because he
apparently had "no limitations, other than hospitalization and monthly treatments, which
substantially limit[ed] activities central to his daily life").
190. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 1159; cf R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d at
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and the Act's record of disability provision is intended to protect individuals
who have recovered from such impairments.'
9
'
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that it had no obligation
to accommodate the plaintiffs chemotherapy treatments. 92 The court noted
that the hospital's management representatives were aware of the temporary
physical limitations the plaintiff experienced after each of those
treatments. 193  Because an employer has an affirmative obligation to
accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified
individual with a disability' 9 4-including limitations that arise from
treatment of the disability' 9 5-the court held that the hospital was required to
accommodate the plaintiff's treatments,196  even though his resulting
limitations were not sufficiently severe to support a finding that he was
currently disabled.' 97
A similar result was reached in Booth v. University Interscholastic
655 ("[I]t is not enough for an ADA plaintiff to simply show that he has a record of a cancer
diagnosis; . . . there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
ADA plaintiffs major life activities.").
191. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 1159 n.4 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.2(k) (2005)); cf Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998)
(observing that the record of disability provision extends protection to individuals "who have
recovered from previously disabling conditions (cancer or coronary disease, for example)");
Comman v. N.P. Dodge Mgmt. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1072-73 (D. Minn. 1999) ("[P]eople with
a history of cancer are precisely the type of individuals the 'record of' provision is meant to
protect.").
192. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 1162.
193. See id. In particular, the hospital's director and associate director both knew the plaintiffs
"white blood cell count usually dropped to low levels for three to four days following each
chemotherapy treatment," and that during this period the plaintiff was required to take certain
precautions "in order to avoid contracting an infection." Id. at 1157.
194. See id. at 1162 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2005)).
195. See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that "side
effects from the medical treatment of disabilities arise 'because of the disability,"' and therefore
must be accommodated by an employer (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a))). But cf. Oswalt v. Sara Lee
Corp., 889 F. Supp. 253, 258 (N.D. Miss. 1995) ("Temporary absence from work due to side effects
of or adjustment to medication does not give an employee a record of impairment.").
196. See Mark, 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) at 1162; cf Opsteen v. Keller Structures, Inc.,
408 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Employers may be required to accommodate short-term medical
limitations . . . by permitting people to work reduced hours for a few weeks or months until
recuperation is complete.").
197. Cf Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 911 (11 th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
plaintiffs contention that "the side effects that he suffered as the result of his chemotherapy
treatments ... substantially limited his major life activities"); Madjlessi v. Macy's W., Inc., 993 F.
Supp. 736, 742 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("[T]he mere fact that [an employee] had cancer and was utterly
incapacitated for brief periods of time after chemotherapy does not mean she was 'substantially
limited' for purposes of the ADA.").
League.198 The plaintiff in Booth invoked Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,'99 which prevents an otherwise qualified individual from being
excluded from a federally assisted program because of a disability,200 to
challenge an athletic league rule that prevented him from participating in
football during his senior year of high school because he had reached the age
of nineteen before the season began.
20
'
In support of his claim, the plaintiff presented evidence that he was
hospitalized with meningococcal meningitis, a potentially fatal illness, at the
age of three.20 2 Although the plaintiff eventually recovered, he suffered
lingering learning impairments that prevented his enrollment in kindergarten
and forced him to repeat first grade.20 3 Crediting this evidence,2° the court
concluded that the plaintiff had a record of an impairment that substantially
limited the major life activity of learning,20 5 and that he therefore was
protected under the Rehabilitation Act.20 6
The court found no evidence that the plaintiff was subjected to
intentional discrimination because of his record of disability. 207 However,
the court did find that but for the residual effects of the plaintiffs childhood
illness on his subsequent progression through school,208 the league rule he
198. No. Civ. A-90-CA-764, 1990 WL 484414 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
200. See Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 makes it unlawful for a federal grant recipient to discriminate against an
otherwise qualified handicapped individual."); N.M. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. State of N.M.,
678 F.2d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that Section 504 "constitutes an across-the-board
requirement of nondiscrimination in all federally assisted programs").
201. See Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *1. Like the ADA, "the Rehabilitation Act provides a
broader prohibition than one limited to discrimination that takes place in the employment setting[.]"
Johnson v. N.Y. Hosp., 897 F. Supp. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Freed v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
201 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act] bars both federal
agencies and private entities that receive federal funding from discriminating on the basis of
disability and is not limited to the employment context.").
202. See Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *2.
203. See id. at *2, *4 n.4.
204. See id. at *3. Some of the evidence before the court was conflicting:
Medical experts for the respective parties disagree over whether the Plaintiffs
learning disabilities were caused by his illness. However, even the [league's] expert
concedes that a residual symptom of meningitis can be difficulty in learning, difficulty in
comprehension, and delay in maturation. Based on all the evidence presented by both




206. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(ii) (2000); see also Thompson v. Rice, 422 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174
(D.D.C. 2006) ("Under the Rehabilitation Act, a person is ... disabled if he has a record of an
impairment.").
207. See Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *3 ("The Court agrees that the Plaintiff is not being excluded
from interscholastic athletics ... because he has a history of being handicapped . ) (emphasis
added).
208. Id. at *5.
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was challenging would not have prevented him from playing football in his
senior season.2 0 9 Thus, the critical issue was whether the league had a duty
to accommodate an individual seeking special treatment based on a prior
mental or physical impairment.21 °
The court held that the league had such an obligation. 21' Because
federally assisted programs are required to accommodate the limitations of
individuals protected under the Rehabilitation Act,1 2 including specifically
those with a record of disability,2 3 the court held that the league was
required to give special consideration to the plaintiff due to his disability
history. 14 More specifically, the court held that the league was required to
make a reasonable accommodation for the residual effects of the plaintiffs
illness2 15 in the form of a waiver of its age eligibility rule in his case.
216
209. In this regard, the court noted that the plaintiff turned nineteen just two days too early to be
eligible under the league's rule, while the learning impairment resulting from his illness "operajed to
delay his early education for at least one year." Id. at * 1.
210. Id. at *3 n.3. Unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act originally contained no reasonable
accommodation provision. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482, 486 (W.D. Ark. 1994),
vacated, 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 98 F.3d 396 (8th Cir. 1996).
However, the "concept of reasonable accommodation, developed by regulation under Section 504,"
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995), and that Rehabilitation
Act provision now effectively incorporates the ADA's reasonable accommodation obligation by
reference. Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000)).
211. Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *5 ("[The league] is compelled to make a reasonable
accommodation for the Plaintiff's special circumstances .... ).
212. See id. at *4 ("[T]he Rehabilitation Act requires that federally assisted programs do more
[than strictly enforce their rules] for those who fall within its ambit."); cf Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of
Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he Rehabilitation Act . . . prohibit[s]
discrimination against qualified disabled individuals by requiring that they receive 'reasonable
accommodations' that permit them to have access to and take a meaningful part in public services
and public accommodations."); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1311 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999)
(Barkett, J., dissenting) ("[Section] 504 requires covered recipients to make reasonable
accommodations to permit individuals with disabilities to participate in programs offered by a
recipient of federal financial assistance.").
213. See Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc'y of W. Cent. Ohio, 625 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 n.4
(S.D. Ohio 1985) (observing that Congress intended that "the protection of Section 504 be extended
to those individuals with a record of a substantially limiting impairment, even if the individual could
be shown to have recovered in whole or in part from that handicapping condition"); Davis v. Bucher,
451 F. Supp. 791, 796 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("[P]ersons who have a history of a handicapping
condition but no longer have the condition . . . are protected from discrimination under section
504.").
214. Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *4; cf Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1334
(M.D. Ala. 1998) ("[T]he 'cure' for ADA discrimination is somewhat different from the 'cure' in
other discrimination cases. In cases dealing with other forms of discrimination, the baseline is that
the protected characteristic should be ignored .... The baseline is different in ADA cases, however.
Under the ADA, the protected characteristic (disability) must not be ignored, but rather should
specifically be taken consideration of, and the employer must act on the basis of that
characteristic.").
215. Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *4 n.4, *5.
Although Booth arose under the Rehabilitation Act,2 17 the court's
reasoning is equally applicable in ADA cases218 because claims arising
under the two acts are typically analyzed in the same manner.219 Indeed,
Congress borrowed liberally from Section 504's substantive provisions
when it enacted the ADA provisions protecting disabled persons from
discrimination by private employers, 220  and Congress, therefore, also
simultaneously indicated that the case law developed under the
Rehabilitation Act is applicable in ADA cases as well.22'
V. REQUIRING ACCOMMODATIONS IN RECORD OF DISABILITY CASES WILL
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE ADA
Contrary to the suggestion in Barnes v. Northwest Iowa Health Center
222
and other cases holding that employers have no duty to accommodate
individuals with a record of disability, 23 imposing such a duty in cases
216. See Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D. Conn.
1996) (observing that the Booth court "found an age requirement waiver to be a reasonable
accommodation"), judgment vacated and appeal dismissed, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996). See
generally Ham v. Nevada, 788 F. Supp. 455, 460 (D. Nev. 1992) ("Since § 504 defendants must
make reasonable accommodations, there will be cases where plaintiffs do not meet all of a
program[']s requirements, but could with reasonable accommodations.").
217. See Jonathan R. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act and its Application to High
School, Collegiate and Professional Athletics, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 252 (1999) ("[T]he
court in Booth . . . held that a waiver of the age-eligibility requirement was a reasonable
accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act." (citing Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *4)).
218. See Jason L. Thomas, Comment, Through the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, High School
Athletes Are Saying "Put Me in Coach": Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 65 U.
CIN. L. REV. 727, 758 n.208 (1997) ("The court in Booth did not address the ADA because the
plaintiffs sole claim was under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the Booth court's reasoning and
analysis applie[s] to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act." (citing Booth, 1990 WL 484414, at *1,
4)).
219. See Oliveras-Sifre v. P.R. Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000); Monette v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996).
220. See Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1339 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The ADA, effective
July 26, 1992, extended to private employees many of the protections afforded the employees of
federal grantees under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."); Nelson v. Ryan, 860 F.
Supp. 76, 82 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that "the ADA borrows much of its substantive framework
from § 504 of the Rehabilitative Act [sic]") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf
Dubois v. Alderson-Broaddus Coll., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. W. Va. 1997) ("Many
provisions of the ADA were based on the Rehabilitation Act.").
221. See Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1339 n.8; Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) (2005)); cf Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828,
832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Although the plaintiffs here brought their claim under the ADA, cases
involving claims under the Rehabilitation Act are instructive. The ADA defines a disability in
substantially the same terms as the Rehabilitation Act defined a handicap (now disability) .... The
legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when interpreting the ADA.").
222. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
223. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1132 (N.D. Iowa 2002)
("[A]s in Barnes, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to [the
plaintiffs] claim of failure to accommodate her disability to the extent that such claim is based on a
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involving lingering or recurring impairments would not "significantly
broaden the sweep of the ADA., 224  In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin
Department of Administration,22 5 for example, the Seventh Circuit held that
"an intermittent impairment that is a characteristic manifestation" of a
disability is "part of the underlying disability and hence a condition that the
employer must reasonably accommodate.2 26  Other courts have reached
essentially the same conclusion.227
Because in many cases "the disabling aspect of a disability is, precisely,
an intermittent manifestation of the disability, rather than the underlying
impairment, ' '2 8 there is no persuasive reason for refusing to extend the
Vande Zande analysis to record of disability cases involving lingering or
recurring impairments. 2 9  Even where such chronic impairments are not
purported failure to accommodate her 'record of disability.").
224. Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 n.17; see also Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d
499, 509 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[D]oes the employer incur a duty to accommodate an employee based
on her history of a substantially limiting impairment, even if her current limitations are not
substantial? If so, the 'record of impairment' provision grants the ADA a significantly broader
sweep than it would otherwise have.").
225. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
226. Id. at 544; see, e.g., Byme v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Time off
may be an apt accommodation for intermittent conditions."). See generally EEOC v. Sara Lee
Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001) ("An intermittent manifestation of a disease must be judged
the same way as all other potential disabilities.").
227. See, e.g., Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
manifested symptoms of an underlying disability may be episodic or temporary in nature while the
impairment itself is both chronic and permanent.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Cehrs v. Ne.
Ohio Alzheimer Research Ctr., 959 F. Supp. 441, 447 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (discussing "flare-ups
[that] are merely one aspect of [an] underlying disability"), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 155 F.3d
775 (6th Cir. 1998).
228. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544; see, e.g., Rosato v. Bamhart, 352 F. Supp. 2d 386, 397
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[A]n integral part of [the plaintiff's] alleged disability involves the unpredictable
and intermittent nature of her attacks."); cf Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1446
(W.D. Wis. 1996) (observing that "sporadic impairments . . . may create a substantial limitation
when viewed cumulatively"); Boeltz v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 753, 756 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that
the "episodic nature" of an impairment made it "no less disabling").
229. In such cases, there may be relatively little difference between an actual disability and a
record of disability. See, e.g., Brown v. BKW Drywall Supply, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 814, 826-27
(S.D. Ohio 2004) ("Episodic, impairing manifestations or flare-ups caused by an underlying chronic
condition may constitute a disability if they occur with sufficient frequency and are of sufficient
duration and severity to substantially limit a major life activity."); Carruth v. Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc.,
12 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1244, 1251 (S.D. II1. 2001) ("[A] temporary, episodic impairment
that recurs periodically as a result of some underlying, chronic condition from which the individual
suffers (i.e., a manifestation of or a flare-up caused by the underlying condition) may constitute a
disability .... ); cf Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381, 1393 (S.D. Cal.
1997) ("Where there are no new intervening causes, and there is a reoccurrence or a relapse of the
prior disability, it is the same disability."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir.
1998).
themselves sufficiently severe to constitute a disability, 230 individuals
protected under the ADA's record of disability provision,23 1 like those
protected under its actual disability provision, 32 should not be denied
reasonable accommodations that might enable them to overcome any
limitations resulting from those impairments.233
V. THE TEXT OF THE ADA APPEARS TO REQUIRE ACCOMMODATIONS IN
RECORD OF DISABILITY CASES
The view that individuals with a record of disability are entitled to
reasonable accommodations also finds support in the text of the ADA
itself.23 4 In D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,235 for example, the Eleventh
Circuit observed that the ADA "plainly prohibits 'not making
reasonable accommodations' for any qualified individual with a disability,
including .. one who is disabled in the actual-impairment or the record-of-
such-an-impairment sense., 23 6  Several commentators have also noted that
the language of the Act logically leads to this conclusion.237
230. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 ("Intermittent, episodic impairments are not
disabilities .... "). But cf London v. Kateri Residence, No. 95 Civ. 3116 (RLE), 1998 WL 644745,
at *8 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 1998) ("There are no doubt some temporary impairments which are
linked to, or caused by, permanent disabilities."), affd, 182 F.3d 900 (2d Cir. 1999).
231. See, e.g., White v. Coyne Int'l Enters. Corp., 15 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 403, 405
(N.D. Ohio 2003) ("Plaintiff claims ... he has a record of a disability because his diabetes causes
intermittent episodes of hyper or hypoglycemia.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Machamer v. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa., 10 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1498, 1500 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(indicating that a record of disability "means a 'history' of [a] condition such as a chronic
reoccurrence of an ailment").
232. See Schluter, 928 F. Supp. at 1446 ("[M]any diseases ... may create intermittent problems
that might not be considered a disability under the [ADA] if viewed in isolation, but would show a
substantial limitation of a major life activity if viewed over an extended period of time. Put another
way ... when an impairment creates smaller intermittent impairments, the disability focus should be
on the effects of the overall impairment.").
233. See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
"[a]dverse effects of disabilities . . . arise 'because of the disability,"' and therefore must be
accommodated (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000))); cf Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174
F.3d 142, 154 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting an interpretation of the ADA that would deny employees
accommodations "when modest accommodations could help them surmount significant although not
substantially limiting symptoms"); Raffaele v. City of N.Y., 16 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 62, 73
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The ADA should not be construed to discourage employers from accommodating
less substantial impairments.").
234. See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that as
defined in the ADA, "'[d]iscrimination' includes 'not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,"' and
"[a] 'disability' includes . .. a record of [a substantially limiting] impairment" (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12102(2) (2000))).
235. 422 F.3d 1220 (1lth Cir. 2005).
236. Id. at 1236 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)); cf S.E. Phillips, Assessment Accommodations,
1997 DET. C.L. REv. 917, 931 ("The ADA states that persons are disabled if they have a physical or
cognitive impairment, a history of such impairment or are regarded as having such an impairment.
This suggests that ... someone with a history of disability who no longer is disabled may qualify. If
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The D 'Angelo court based its observation primarily on the fact that the
text of the ADA does not differentiate between the three types of covered
disabilities in imposing the duty to accommodate.2 38 The court was critical
of courts in some perceived disability cases that have been willing to ignore
this aspect of the text on policy grounds,2 39 asserting that courts are not free
to disregard clear statutory language simply because its literal application
could produce anomalous results.240
Despite the seemingly clear statutory language upon which the
D'Angelo court relied,24' the view that employers have no duty to
so, it may be difficult to deny accommodations even when the evidence suggests they are not
warranted.").
237. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 12, at 186 ("If someone qualifies as an individual with a
disability because she has a record of a substantially limiting impairment, such as leukemia that has
been cured, the plain language of the Act seems to require that her employer make reasonable
accommodations for any of her known physical limitations."); Randal I. Goldstein, Note, Mental
Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 960 (2001)
("The statute forbids 'not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.' Because an individual who ... has
a 'record of' a substantially limiting impairment is an individual with a disability, the statute seems
to demand reasonable accommodations for that individual's current limitations." (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12102(2))).
238. See DAngelo, 422 F.3d at 1236; see also Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d
874, 894 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding "no statutory basis for differentiating among the three types of
plaintiffs in determining which individuals are entitled to a reasonable accommodation"); Gilbert,
supra note 24, at 673 ("The ADA prohibits employers from refusing to make reasonable
accommodations for 'the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability.' No distinction is made among the actual, 'record of', or 'regarded as' prongs of
the ADA." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994))).
239. In Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003), for example, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that in imposing a duty to accommodate, the ADA "does not differentiate
between the three alternative prongs of the 'disability' definition." Id. at 1232. However, "because
a formalistic reading of the ADA in this context [might] lead to bizarre results," the court looked
"beyond the literal language of the ADA," and held that employers have "no duty to accommodate
an employee in an 'as regarded' case." Id. at 1232-33. The D'Angelo court asserted that this
reasoning "wholly disregards the plain meaning of the statute's language." 422 F.3d at 1238; see
also Gelfo, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 894 ("[N]umerous ... courts [have] rejected the argument that courts
are free to ignore a statute's plain language and conclude an employer has no duty under the ADA to
provide an accommodation unless an employee is actually disabled.").
240. See D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1238; cf Badger-Powhatan, A Div. of Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. United
States, 633 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 n.13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) ("[T]he court ... will not rewrite the
statute to avoid hypothetical anomalies . ... Congress may choose to amend the statute if it finds
untenable the remote chance of such anomalous results occurring."). See generally Tri-Bio Labs.,
Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 143 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he process of effectuating congressional
intent at times may yield anomalies, and the explicit language of a statute in application may
produce a curious result. Nevertheless . . . nothing prohibit[s] Congress from passing unwise
legislation .... ") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
241. Finding the statutory language to be less clear than other courts have claimed, the Ninth
Circuit asserted in Kaplan that the "absence of a stated distinction" between the ADA's three
alternative definitions of disability "is not tantamount to an explicit instruction by Congress that [all
accommodate individuals with a record of disability has found support
among some commentators.242 The principal rationale for this view does
indeed appear to be that the imposition of such a duty occasionally would
lead to bizarre results. 243 Relying on the fact that the ADA purports to
require an employer to accommodate the "known physical or mental
limitations" of any individual with a statutorily defined disability, 244 one
commentator posited the following hypothetical example of the anomalies a
literal reading of the ADA could produce:
If someone qualifies as an individual with a disability because she
has a record of a substantially limiting impairment, such as
leukemia that has been cured, the plain language of the Act seems to
require that her employer make reasonable accommodations for any
of her known physical limitations. This implies that even if
employers are not generally required to accommodate carpal tunnel
syndrome because it does not substantially limit any recognized
major life activity, the leukemia survivor's employer would have to
accommodate her carpal tunnel syndrome; her record of leukemia
would entitle her to accommodation for any known physical
limitation.245
While this hypothetical serves to illustrate an ambiguity in the statutory
text,246 it provides no basis for refusing to recognize a duty to accommodate
in record of disability cases.247 Because the duty to accommodate is merely
statutorily disabled] individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations." Kaplan, 323 F.3d at
1232.
242. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 12, at 186 ("Although it makes sense to protect people with a
record of a severe impairment ... from discrimination on that basis, the definition of disability for
purposes of requiring accommodation should include only actual, current impairments."); Goldstein,
supra note 237, at 960 ("As a practical matter, ...it makes little sense to offer [a reasonable
accommodation] remedy to anyone who is not 'actually disabled."').
243. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 12, at 186.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
245. Friedland, supra note 12, at 186; cf Martin v. Kansas, 978 F. Supp. 992, 998-99 (D. Kan.
1997) (concluding that an employer's duty to accommodate a disabled individual's impairment "is
not affected by the particular medical cause of the impairment").
246. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 Am- Disabilities Cases (BNA) 198, 207 ("On its
face, ... [the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision] leaves open the question of which
limitations the employer must accommodate."), vacated, 7 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 555 (3d
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998); Fontanilla v. City & County of S.F., 11 Am.
Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1207, 1220-21 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that the ADA does not specifically
address "whether an employer must accommodate any limitations that burden a worker whom the
ADA classifies as 'disabled' or whether the employer need only accommodate those limitations that
arise as a result of the worker's statutorily defined 'disability'); Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the
Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability
Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935 (2000) ("[T]he statute does not indicate whether an employer
must accommodate any performance limitation of a protected employee or only those limitations
that are caused by the disability itself.").
247. The hypothetical actually does not illustrate a problem unique to the ADA's record of
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a component of the ADA's broader prohibition of discrimination "because
of' an individual's disability, 48 courts have generally rejected the view that
an employer is required to accommodate limitations unrelated to a disability
giving rise to protection under the Act.
249
In Felix v. New York City Transit Authority,250 for example, the plaintiff
sought accommodation for a condition that, as in the foregoing
hypothetical,25' did not arise from her disability.25 2 The plaintiff argued that
the limitation an employer must accommodate need not be the disabling
impairment giving rise to protection under the ADA. 53  While this
technically may be correct,254 the district court in Felix held that an employer
has no obligation to accommodate limitations that have no relationship to
disability provision. It instead reflects the fact that, if read literally, the Act would require employers
to accommodate any known physical or mental limitations of any statutorily disabled individual, and
not merely individuals with a record of disability. See Jacobs v. Potter, No. 99-T-1357-N, 2005 WL
3690546, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2005) (noting that the ADA "does not simply require an
employer to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee's disability, it requires an employer
to accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an employee with a disability").
248. See Conrad v. Eaton Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1002 (N.D. Iowa 2004) ("The ADA
prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified employee who is disabled because of his
disability. Under the ADA, discrimination is defined to include the failure to make a reasonable
accommodation ..." (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000))); cf Erickson v. Bd. of
Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for Ne. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 960 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no duty to accommodate that is separate from the general obligation to avoid
discrimination against the disabled."); Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d
993, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("The obligation to make reasonable accommodation is a form of non-
discrimination." (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2005))).
249. See, e.g., Coleman-Adebayo v. Leavitt, 326 F. Supp. 2d 132, 143 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The Act
only proscribes the failure to provide reasonable accommodations ...when that failure occurs
'against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. . . .' 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(emphasis added). It follows ... that the accommodation must be tied to a specific disability raised
by a plaintiff in his or her request for accommodation.").
250. 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003). For a more thorough academic discussion of Felix, see Kelly
Cahill Timmons, Limiting "'Limitations ": The Scope of the Duty of Reasonable Accommodation
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 313 passim (2005).
251. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
252. See Felix, 324 F.3d at 106 ("[The plaintiff] seeks a workplace accommodation for a mental
condition which does not flow directly from her disability .... ").
253. See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Plaintiffs
are asking this Court to ... find that the limitation that defines an ADA disability does not
necessarily need to be the subject of the requested accommodation."), aff'd, 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2003).
254. See generally Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing that "the
ADA requires employers to accommodate the limitations arising from a disability, and not the
disability itself'); Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (E.D. La. 1996) ("It is
important ... to distinguish between a disability and a limitation. The employer must accommodate
limitations, not disabilities."), aff'd, 134 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 1998).
the condition that constitutes a statutorily protected disability.255  In
affirming this ruling, 56 the Second Circuit refused to interpret the ADA to
require employers to accommodate impairments that do not themselves
substantially limit an individual's major life activities merely because the
individual also happens to have an unrelated disability.257
Other courts have also held that an individual seeking an ADA
accommodation must show that it would alleviate an impairment arising
from a covered disability 58 because the Act does not require
accommodations "not causally related to the alleged disability."25 9 These
courts (and some commentators) 260 base this conclusion primarily on the text
of the Act itself:
[W]hat the ADA forbids is discrimination "because of the disability
of' the qualified individual, and discrimination "on the basis of
disability" . . . . Thus, the language of the Act, in defining
discrimination to include the failure to make reasonable
accommodation for an otherwise qualified employee's known
disability, does not require an employer to make accommodation for
255. See Felix, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 660 ("[B]ecause there was no nexus or causal connection
between [the employee's] ADA-qualifying limitation and the reasonable accommodation sought,
[the employee] cannot invoke the protections of the ADA.").
256. See Felix, 324 F.3d at 104.
257. See id. at 106; cf Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 110 (lstCir. 2005) (Howard,
J., concurring in part) ("The ADA's purpose is to provide a disabled employee with a reasonable
accommodation that will help the employee overcome the limitation caused by his or her particular
disability; it is not a statute intended to provide benefits to an employee simply because the
employee happens to be disabled.").
258. See, e.g., Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onodaga, P.C., 250 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) ("The ADA obligates an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation for the limitations
arising from an employee's disability."), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004);
Gruber v. Entergy Corp., 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1028, 1031 (E.D. La. 1997) ("Employers
are obligated to make reasonable accommodations only to those limitations resulting from the
disability that are known to the employer.") (emphasis added).
259. A. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, 99 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Buckley v.
Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1998) (en bane)); see also Hines v. Chrysler Corp.,
231 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1037 (D. Colo. 2002) ("Under the ADA, when an individual has a disability,
her employer must accommodate the limitations which the disability causes to the extent that the
accommodation is 'reasonable."') (emphasis added); Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d
893, 896 (N.D. 111. 2002) ("Failure to accommodate a limitation constitutes discrimination 'because
of the disability' only if the limitation is caused by the disability.").
260. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 246, at 935-36 ("The ADA's general antidiscrimination rule
prohibits employers from discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability. One form of discrimination is not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability .... [T]hese two
provisions arguably limit the employer's accommodation duty to only those limitations that are
caused by the disability .... (internal punctuation and footnotes omitted)).
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an impairment that is not a disability within the meaning of the Act
or that does not result from such a disability.
2 6
'
Because a record of disability claim is generally subject to the same
analysis as other disability discrimination claims, 262 interpreting the ADA to
require reasonable accommodations in record of disability cases will not
force employers to accommodate limitations unrelated to the disability of
which an individual has a record263 any more than they are required to
accommodate limitations unrelated to actual disabilities 264 (or, for that
matter, perceived disabilities).2 65  Employers instead would merely be
required to accommodate those lingering or recurring impairments that,
while perhaps not themselves substantially limiting,266 clearly arise from a
past disability. 267  Thus, the policy argument most often advanced in
opposition to this interpretation of the ADA-the fact that it may lead to
261. Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a), (b)(3)(A) (1990)); see also Huberty v. Wash. County Hous. & Redevelopment. Auth.,
374 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (D. Minn. 2005) (holding that a Rehabilitation Act plaintiff was required to
show that her requested accommodation was "linked to ... disability-related needs").
262. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 846, 851 n.4 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (perceiving
no reason why the analysis in actual disability cases "would not apply also to claims brought under
the companion [record of disability provision]"); Hannah v. County of Cook, 30 Nat'l Disability L.
Rep. (LRP) 117, at 539 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (observing that "the analysis under [the record of disability
provision] is the same as the analysis under [the actual disability provision]"); cf Taylor v. Gearan,
979 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that "the tests for having a record of or being perceived as
disabled mirror the test for having an actual disability").
263. See, e.g., Herschaft v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, No. 00 CV 2748 (CBA), 2001 WL 940923, at
*3 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) (rejecting a record of disability claim where there was "no nexus
between plaintiffs past disability and the accommodation that he [was] seeking"), aff'd, 37 F. App'x
17 (2d Cir. 2002).
264. See generally Amariglio v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 941 F. Supp. 173, 179 (D.D.C. 1996)
("Although employers cannot discriminate due to a person's disability, the ADA does not require
employers to provide assistance unrelated to such disability .... ).
265. See Travis, supra note 246, at 936 ("Even if 'disability' includes perceived disabilities, [the
ADA] arguably limit[s] the employer's accommodation duty to only those limitations that are
caused by the disability -- either actual or perceived.").
266. See Crock v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 F. Supp. 2d I 101, 1117 (S.D. Iowa 2003) ("[E]ven
severe symptoms which are episodic do not constitute a substantial limitation on a major life
activity."); White v. Coyne Int'l Enters. Corp., 15 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 403, 406 (N.D.
Ohio 2003) ("[E]ven if [a] plaintiff suffers from chronic episodic conditions, short-term restrictions
on major life activities are not disabilities.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. See, e.g., Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the "permanent or long term impact or expected impact resulting from the impairment"
of an individual with a record of disability); Gilbert, supra note 24, at 674 (noting that individuals
covered under the record of disability provision "may presently experience some type of limitations
from an impairment").
nonsensical results 268--does not provide a persuasive reason for rejecting
it.269
VII. IMPOSING A DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE MAY HELP CORRECT
ERRONEOUS PERCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH A RECORD OF DISABILITY
There is yet another persuasive argument for interpreting the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement to encompass individuals with a
record of disability. 270 This argument reflects the ADA's intended purpose
of redressing the unfounded "prejudices and biases of employers and co-
workers""27 that limit the employment opportunities of individuals with past
disabilities,272 and not merely the opportunities of those who suffer from
actual (i.e., current) disabilities. 273
In this regard, Congress was influenced by the Supreme Court's analysis
in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,274 a Rehabilitation Act case
decided shortly before the ADA was enacted. 275 The Arline Court discussed
268. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 12, at 185 (asserting that the ADA's extension of protection
to individuals with a record of disability does "not make sense in relation to the accommodation
requirement").
269. See generally D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005)
("[B]ecause we could craft a hypothetical that produces a result we might find anomalous is
insufficient reason for disregarding the terms of the statute.").
270. In this regard, one court has observed that "the ADA's broad imposition of a duty to
accommodate" extends to "any form of disability." Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transp., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 133, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated and remanded, 205 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2000).
271. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Mayers v.
Wash. Adventist Hosp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (D. Md. 2001) ("The ADA protects claimants
from adverse employment decisions based upon unfounded perceptions, stereotypes, and myths
concerning the abilities of disabled individuals."), ajd, 22 F. App'x 158 (4th Cir. 2001); Hirsch v.
Nat'l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980 (N.D. I11. 1997) ("Congress' purpose in passing the
ADA was to prevent employers from making employment decisions on the basis of unfounded
stereotypes about the capabilities of disabled persons in the workforce.").
272. See Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that "a
person is considered disabled [under the ADA] if she . . . is stigmatized by 'a record of [a
substantially limiting] impairment"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1990))); Francis v. City of
Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing individuals protected under the ADA because
their "history of impairment ... is stigmatizing").
273. See Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 176 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[W]hether actually
impaired or not, [an individual] may be the victim of stereotypic assumptions, myths, and fears
regarding [the] limitations [of individuals with disabilities].") (internal punctuation and citation
omitted). But cf Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1995) (observing that
the ADA seeks "to ensure that the truly disabled will not face discrimination because of
stereotypes") (emphasis added).
274. 480 U.S. 273 (1987), superseded by statute on other grounds, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1992).
275. One federal appellate court has asserted that Congress actually "codified Arline in the ADA."
EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000). While this may be a modest
overstatement, Congress clearly "had Arline in mind when it enacted the ADA." Rizzo v. Children's
World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 221 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at
167 (discussing "Congress's explicit recall of Arline in the legislative history of the ADA"). By
embracing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Arline, "employer speculation and stereotyping [is]
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at some length the employment obstacles faced by those with a record of
disability, 27 6 noting that even individuals who have recovered from
noninfectious diseases such as epilepsy or cancer may be subjected to
employment discrimination based upon irrational fears that they could be
contagious.277 Other courts have also noted the biased and irrational
treatment occasionally experienced by individuals with a disability
history,278 including specifically those with a record of mental disability.279
Ironically, the erroneous perceptions and irrational prejudices that can
unfairly stigmatize an individual with a record of disability may not even
reflect the views of the employer itself.280  Impermissible employment
decisions may simply be based on the employer's concerns about the
potential reactions of others,28'" such as the individual's coworkers,282 the
precisely what the authors of the ADA's legislative history ... sought to prevent." EEOC v. Exxon
Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 635, 644 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, 202 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2000).
276. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals Regarded as
Having Disabilities Under The Americans With Disabilities Act? Why "No" Should Not Be The
Answer, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 895, 902-03 (2006) ("In its Arline opinion, the Court discussed
individuals with records of handicaps ... and how employers' and co-workers' perceptions about
these issues can be just as debilitating as actual handicaps.").
277. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; cf Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 541 A.2d 682, 684
(N.J. 1988) ("Despite recent advances in knowledge and treatment of epilepsy, it remains a
misunderstood handicap. The term 'epilepsy' itself evokes stereotypical fears that perpetuate
discrimination against its victims in all aspects of life, including employment.") (footnote omitted).
278. See, e.g., Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720-21 (8th Cir. 2003) (describing an
individual with a record of disability who was regarded by his coworkers "as 'stupid' and 'not
playing with a full deck' because of his epilepsy and [a] resulting operation" that alleviated his
seizures, and who "was routinely referred to as 'platehead' because he had a metal plate in his skull
as a result of the operation); see also Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1132
(N.D. Iowa 2002) (discussing a hypothetical employee who "has a 'record of disability,' and is
harassed on that basis"); Blanck, supra note 23, at 896 n.97 (observing that individuals with a record
of disability are occasionally "denied employment opportunity on the basis that their employer
believes an accommodation may be required in the future").
279. See Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing "the continuing stigma of
being a former psychiatric patient"); Godwin v. Florida, 593 So. 2d 211, 214 (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "debilitating stigma... attached to people
who have histories of mental disability"); Long, supra note 20, at 682 ("[A]n individual who was
once institutionalized with a mental impairment carries that stigma with her when she applies for a
job and is vulnerable to any fears or discomfort her employer may have about mental illness."). See
generally Vislisel v. Tumage, 759 F. Supp. 1366, 1367 (N.D. Iowa 1990) (discussing "former
mentally ill (but now cured) persons who, although they are not mentally impaired, remain mentally
handicapped for employment purposes because of their prior mental illness"), aff'd, 930 F.2d 9 (8th
Cir. 1991).
280. See, e.g., Doe v. Denny's, Inc., 963 P.2d 650, 655 (Or. 1998) (observing that an "[e]mployer
was not, by informing plaintiff about adverse customer perceptions of her disability, making its own
evaluation of her ability to perform"); see also Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Mgmt. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d
1066, 1072 (D. Minn. 1999) (discussing "the possible negative reactions or stereotypes of third-
parties to the impairment of which the employee has a record").
281. See Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) ("An employer
employer's customers,283 clients,284 or vendors,285 and occasionally even the
public at large. 86
Recognizing that such erroneous perceptions can be as disabling as the
physical or mental limitations that arise from actual impairments,287
Congress extended the ADA's protection to individuals with past
disabilities in order to shield them-no less than those with existing
disabilities2 8 -from just such unfounded attitudes. 28 9  In doing SO, 2 9 0
may ... refus[e] to hire an individual because of the fear that others may react negatively to the fact
that the individual . . . once had a disease, even if the disease poses no danger to others."); Johnson
v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, Inc., No. 4:98CV3225, 1999 WL 33445683, at *1
(D. Neb. Oct. 1, 1999) ("The second and third prongs of the [ADA] definition [of disability]-record
of an impairment or regarded as having an impairment-relate .. .to the perceptions and fears of
third persons who come into contact with an individual with a disability." (quoting William J.
McDevitt, Defining the Term "Disability" Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 281, 285 (1998))). See generally Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1369-70
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (describing the pervasive discrimination disabled persons have experienced on the
purported ground that "others would [feel] uncomfortable around them").
282. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2005) (noting that a lack of "acceptance by coworkers" is one
of the "common attitudinal barriers that frequently result in employers excluding individuals with
disabilities"); Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 n.13 (discussing "irrational fears or prejudice on the part
of ... fellow workers" that can make it difficult for individuals with a disability history to secure
employment) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
283. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2() (observing that statutory protection exists where an employer
"discriminates against ... an individual because of the negative reactions of customers"); Wilson v.
Ga.-Pac. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (discussing "the situation in which an
employer allows the actual, negative attitudes of its customers ... to affect the employer's treatment
of [an] employee").
284. See Cornman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (noting that an employer might discriminate against an
employee with a record of disability "out of fear of the reaction of clients"); Meisser v. Hove, 872 F.
Supp. 507, 522 n.10 (N.D. 11. 1994) ("An employer's concern about a client's reaction to an
employee's handicap can be a powerful means of perpetuating stereotypes and holding back
qualified workers.").
285. See, e.g., Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 84 (W. Va.
1989) (discussing an individual who was denied a promotion due to the employer's concern that her
disability would be "unsavory and unacceptable for [an employee] who dealt with vendors and
customers") (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. See Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 958 (E.D. Cal. 1990)
(discussing the possibility of "discrimination based on public perception of a person's handicap"); cf
Serrano v. County of Arlington, 986 F. Supp. 992, 999 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("[I]t is ... societal
prejudices about disabled persons and disabilities that are at the heart of the ADA."); Saladin v.
Turner, 936 F. Supp. 1571, 1581 (N.D. Okla. 1996) ("Under the ADA, effect may not be given to the
public's fears or stereotypes.").
287. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; see also Serrano, 986 F. Supp. at 999 ("[T]he 'myths and fears'
surrounding disabilities are just as limiting in an individual's search for meaningful work as are the
constraints imposed by actual disabilities."); MeCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., 929 F. Supp.
1489, 1498 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[T]he perception [of] others that one is substantially limited in a major
life activity can be just as disabling as actually being disabled." (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 283));
Ammons-Lewis v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 16 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 386, 390
(N.D. I11. 2004) (noting that "people with impairments can be more limited by the attitudes of their
employers towards the impairment as [sic] by the actual impairment").
288. See generally Eric A. Besner, Employment Legislation for Disabled Individuals: What Can
France Learn From the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 399, 413 (1995)
(observing that under the ADA, "someone discriminated against due to a record of
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Congress clearly intended to protect those individuals who are so
stigmatized by their past disabilities that they are substantially limited in
their ability to find or retain employment.29
The ADA's reasonable accommodation provision,292 in turn, imposes on
employers an affirmative obligation to explore ways to remove barriers to
the employment of persons protected by the Act.293 Those barriers include
the unfounded fears and stereotypes that motivated Congress to extend the
Act's protection to individuals with a record of disability. 294  Thus,
impairment... receives the same protections as an individual who possesses the impairment").
289. See MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 106 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (E.D. Ky. 2000) ("[A]n
individual who has recovered from a disabling condition but faces discrimination because of fears
and stereotypes is protected under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act."); Gribben v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (18 Am. Disabilities Cases) 91, 94 (D. Ariz. March 8, 2006)
("The ADA ... covers people who have a history of disability... 'but who remain vulnerable to the
fears and stereotypes of their employers."' (quoting Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d
499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998))); Parikh, supra note 65, at 752 ("The ADA drafters designed the 'record
of prong of disability to protect individuals who have overcome their disability from an employer's
residual hostility or stereotyping.").
290. The ADA's protection of individuals with a record of disability mirrors an earlier amendment
of the Rehabilitation Act. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, §
111(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(ii) (2000)). These
amendments "added [a] record of impairment section to the Rehabilitation Act in order to prevent
'society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease' from being the basis of denying
employment." Taylor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 771 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (quoting Arline,
480 U.S. at 284), rev'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991). By extending the
protection of both acts to individuals with a record of disability, "Congress sought to protect [them]
against discrimination 'stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from archaic attitudes and
laws and from the fact that the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the
difficulties confronting individuals with handicaps."' Rollf v. Interim Pers., Inc., 10 Am.
Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1656, 1659 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 279) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
291. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 633 (1999)
("[The record of disability provision] applies to persons who have recovered, either totally or
partially, from a condition that constituted an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity.
These individuals are included in the [statutory] definition [of disability] because Congress
recognized the potential stigma that attaches once an individual is labeled as handicapped and the
detrimental effects of that stigma on an individual's opportunities for employment and services.")
(footnote omitted).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
293. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2005) ("The reasonable accommodation requirement is best
understood as a means by which barriers to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with
a disability are removed or alleviated."); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1237
(9th Cir. 1999) ("The ADA places a 'duty to accommodate' on employers in order to remove
barriers that could impede the ability of qualified individuals with disabilities to perform their
jobs.").
294. See Patrick v. S. Co. Servs., 910 F. Supp. 566, 568 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (observing that the
record of disability provision reflects "a recognition by Congress that stereotyped assumptions about
what constitutes a disability and unfounded concerns about the limitations of individuals with
disabilities form major discriminatory barriers . . . to those persons either previously disabled, [or]
"Congress provided for reasonable accommodations" in part "to counter the
prejudices of employers and co-workers who, in the absence of an
accommodation, may otherwise erroneously perpetuate a disabling view of
[an] employee's nondisabling impairment., 295
This interpretation of the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision
is reflected in the employer's obligation to engage in an interactive process
with employees and applicants who request accommodations.29 6  An
employer participating in this process may acquire information about the
medical history of an individual with a record of disability297 that can be
used in making an informed decision with respect to whether an
accommodation might assist the individual in performing the essential
functions of a particular job.298
misclassified as previously disabled" (quoting 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.1 (1995)),
affd, 103 F.3d 149 (11 th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1542
(S.D. Fla. 1995) ("[T]he overarching purpose of the ADA [is] to eliminate the stigma and
stereotypes associated with disability and to eradicate discrimination on the basis of such
stereotypes .... The point of the [Act] is to start breaking down those barriers of fear and prejudice
and unfounded fears, to get past that point so that people begin to look at people based on their
abilities, not first looking at their disability." (quoting Carol J. Banta, Note, The Impact of the
Americans With Disabilities Act on State Bar Examiners' Inquiries into the Psychological History of
Bar Applicants, 94 MICH. L. REV. 167, 177-78 (1995))).
295. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (supplemental
decision); cf Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Where a
worker is disabled an employer may not assume stereotypically an inability to work and (beyond
this) must provide 'reasonable accommodation' unless undue hardship is shown." (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5))); Tumlinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 15 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 193, 199
(W.D. Tex. 2003) (indicating that an employer may be obligated to accommodate an individual
despite "nonacceptance of the accommodation ... by [his] coworkers," where the "nonacceptance
reflects myths, fears or stereotypes regarding the impact of [his] medical condition"). See generally
Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A]ccommodations may adjust
for the practical impact of a disability, not only for the immediate manifestations of the physical or
mental impairment giving rise to the disability.").
296. See Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 2001) ("As part of the
reasonable accommodation duty, the ADA requires employers to engage in an interactive process
with disabled employees needing accommodation so that together they can identify the employee's
needs and discuss accommodation options."). For a discussion of the ADA's interactive process, see
PollyBeth Proctor, Determining 'Reasonable Accommodation' Under the ADA: Understanding
Employer and Employee Rights and Obligations During the Interactive Process, 33 Sw. U. L. REV.
51 (2003).
297. See Mudra v. Sch. City of Hammond, 16 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 1095, 1100 (N.D.
Ind. 2004) ("[A]sking for more information regarding the nature of an illness is part of the
interactive process that is part of finding reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee.")
(citations omitted); see, e.g., Mercado Rivera v. Loctite P.R., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.P.R.
2002) (discussing an employer's request, made during the interactive process, that its employee "fill
out an authorization form to obtain a release of her medical records in an effort to accommodate
her").
298. See Mendez v. Gearan, 956 F. Supp. 1520, 1528 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing an employer's
need "to gather all the relevant information regarding [an employee's] history" in order "to
determine what accommodations were necessary to allow [her] to perform her job"). See
generally 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2006) ("[A]scertain[ing] the precise barrier to the employment
opportunity ...will make it possible to determine the accommodation(s) that could alleviate or
remove that barrier.").
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More specifically, the interactive process may enable an employer to
identify potential accommodations, such as workplace educational
programs,2 99 that could assist in correcting its own misperceptions 00
or--difficult as this may be 30 -the misperceptions of its employees 30 2 about
the impact of an individual's medical history on his or her ability to perform
the job.30 3 "In this sense, the ADA encourages employers to become more
enlightened about their employees' capabilities, while protecting employees
from employers whose attitudes remain mired in prejudice." 30 4
299. See, e.g., Kent v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (describing an
employer's attempt to accommodate a disabled employee "by requiring all of [her co-workers] to
attend sensitivity training sessions that focused on working well with other employees, especially
those with handicaps"); cf EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999)
("[T]he extent to which an employer has adopted antidiscrimination policies and educated its
employees about the requirements of the ADA is important .... ").
300. See Kelly v. Metallics W. Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[A]n employer.., must
be prepared to accommodate the artificial limitations created by his or her own faulty perceptions.");
Ellen M. Saideman, The ADA as a Tool for Advocacy: A Strategy for Fighting Employment
Discrimination Against People With Disabilities, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 47, 56 (1993-94) (observing that
"[i]n some circumstances, reasonable accommodation may be required to correct the perception" an
employer has of "an individual with a record of disability"). See generally Erickson v. Bd. of
Governors of Coils. & Univs. for Ne. 111. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 960 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (observing that "[e]mployers must affirmatively act to alter any practices they have in
place that discriminate against the disabled").
301. See Mitchell v. Crowell, 966 F. Supp. 1071, 1080 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 1996) ("In most cases, . . . it
will be practically impossible for an employer to accommodate an individual who is disabled based
upon the perceptions of others."), reconsideration denied, 975 F. Supp. 1440 (N.D. Ala. 1997);
Travis, supra note 246, at 999 n.411 ("Of course, there may be limits to what an employer can do
with respect to third parties.").
302. See, e.g., Morgan v. City & County of S.F., 11 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 303, at 1262
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing an employee's request for accommodation in the form of "periodic
seminars and meetings to provide education to coworkers, and specifically requiring attendance of
[her] superiors, regarding mental health disabilities and unfounded stereotypes, myths and stigmas"),
affd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); cf Mawson v. U.S. W. Bus. Res., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1204,
1206 (D. Colo. 1998) ("Plaintiff claims the harassment of coworkers intensified his physical and
mental disabilities which [the employer], by failing to put an end to the harassment, failed
reasonably to accommodate.").
303. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 198, 208 n.22 (3d Cir.
1997) ("After an employee requests accommodation, a meaningful interactive exchange could well
rectify any misperceptions regarding the employee's impairments."), vacated, 7 Am. Disabilities
Cases (BNA) 555 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998); Gilbert, supra note 24, at 670
("Where the employee does have a history of substantial limitations, and the employer's adverse
action turns upon unfounded stereotyping, 'record of' liability is appropriate .... In many cases,
however, the employee's limitations are vocationally relevant; therefore, the employer must make
judgments about those limitations in its workplace .... Ideally, those judgments should be formed
through an interactive process with the employee, individualized assessment of the effect of any
limitations upon the essential job functions, a thorough discussion of any reasonable
accommodations, and accurate medical input.").
304. Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676; see also Travis, supra note 246, at 999 ("If there is a risk that the
employer's prior misperception will continue to color future employment interactions,
If, on the other hand, there is no duty to accommodate in record of
disability cases,3" 5 the employer would have no corresponding obligation-
and thus relatively little incentive36-to engage in the interactive process.3 °7
Because an employer who does not "engage in the interactive process" may
overlook a potential means of accommodating a statutorily disabled
employee,30 8 this interpretation of the ADA is contrary to the spirit of the
Act,30 9 even if the employer could not be held accountable in a strictly legal
sense for its oversight. 31 ° As one court explained:
'accommodation' might require additional education in the workplace. If the employer's
misperception stemmed from coworkers' assumptions or prejudices, 'accommodation' might require
mandatory sensitivity training. If the employer's misperception resulted from customers' erroneous
beliefs, 'accommodation' might require a creative marketing plan to reduce irrational consumer
tastes.") (footnotes omitted).
305. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1132 (N.D. Iowa 2002)
(asserting that an employee "cannot, as a matter of law, assert a failure-to-accommodate claim based
on a record of disability").
306. An employer under no specific obligation to participate in the interactive process
nevertheless would have some incentive to do so because its participation may be "probative as to
whether it acted in good faith in disqualifying [an employee] from various jobs." Ragan v. Jeffboat,
LLC, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001); see also Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp.
2d 151, 171 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (supplemental decision) ("The ADA provides an incentive for
employers to engage in the interactive process in good faith by precluding compensatory and
punitive damages against employers that make 'good faith efforts, in consultation with the person
with the disability.., to identify and make a reasonable accommodation ....' (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1981 a (3) (2000))).
307. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Without the possibility
of liability ...employers would have less incentive to engage in a cooperative dialogue and to
explore fully the existence and feasibility of reasonable accommodations."), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); cf. Bishop v. Nu-Way Serv.
Stations, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2004) ("[B]ecause Defendant was not
required to make reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff's perceived disability, it was not required
to engage in the interactive process of determining such an accommodation either.").
308. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998); Mengine v. Runyon, 114
F.3d 415, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. Vanderpool v. Sysco Food Servs., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141
(D. Or. 2001) ("If the interactive process did not occur, it is difficult to tell whether accommodation
would have been possible[.]").
309. See, e.g., Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003) (observing that the "failure to
accommodate the needs of qualified persons with disabilities may result directly
from .. .impermissible stereotypes"), affid, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). See generally EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[The ADA] obligates an employer to engage
in the interactive process precisely for the purpose of allowing both parties to act upon information
instead of assumptions."); Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676 ("The ADA is concerned with safeguarding the
employee's livelihood from adverse actions taken on the basis of 'stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability' of the employee." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000))).
310. See Battle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 864 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Under the ADA,
if no reasonable accommodation is available, an employer is not liable for failing to engage in a
good-faith interactive process."); cf. Stephenson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 23 Nat'l Disability L.
Rep. (LRP) 104, at 487 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("Employers who fail to engage in the interactive process
in good faith face liability, but only if a reasonable accommodation would actually have been
possible."); Mojica v. Sw. Airlines Co., 15 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 138, at 662 (N.D. I11.
1999) ("An employer has a duty to engage in the interactive process to determine an appropriate
accommodation only if the employee has a disability which can be accommodated."), appeal
dismissed, 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000).
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The interactive process is the key mechanism for facilitating the
integration of disabled employees into the workplace .... Without
the interactive process, many employees [and employers] will be
unable to identify effective reasonable accommodations .... This
is a long way from the framework of cooperative problem solving
based on open and individualized exchange in the workplace that
the ADA intended.311
In short, the ADA's emphasis on encouraging employers to engage in an
interactive process with their employees in order to identify effective
accommodations 312 provides a persuasive reason for rejecting the view that
the right to reasonable accommodations only extends to those individuals
who are actually disabled.31 3 If the employer chooses to ignore this critical
aspect of the statutory scheme in a record of disability case, 314 "it is hardly a
'bizarre' result to hold the employer accountable. 315
VIII.CONCLUSION
Some individuals with a disability history undoubtedly do not need
accommodations in order to be productive employees.31 6  In addition,
311. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116; cf Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 97 (1st Cir. 2003) (Bownes,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing employer behavior that "conflicts with the
purpose of the ADA, which places emphasis on encouraging the employer to engage in an interactive
process with the individual to determine an effective reasonable accommodation") (internal
punctuation and citation omitted).
312. See Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219 (D. Me. 2001) (discussing
Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996)).
313. See id. at 218 (rejecting this view despite its "support in [other] circuits"); cf Jacques
v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (asserting that "the interactive
process ... is a prophylactic means to guard against capable employees losing their jobs even if they
are not actually disabled").
314. See generally Smith v. Midland Brake Co., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The
obligation to engage in an interactive process is inherent in the statutory obligation to offer a
reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified disabled employee. The interactive process is
typically an essential component of the process by which a reasonable accommodation can be
determined.").
315. Jewell, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 219; see also McClean v. Case Corp., 314 F. Supp. 2d 911, 918
(D.N.D. 2004) ("An employer's failure to engage in the interactive process is prima facie evidence
that it may be acting in bad faith."); cf Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 646
(2d Cir. 1998) (observing that providing "potentially debatable accommodations" to individuals with
a record of impairment is "a sensible way to avoid litigation, liability, and confrontation").
316. See McGowan, supra note 36, at 112 ("[M]any [persons] with a record of a disability do not
need or seek reasonable accommodations." (footnotes omitted)); Saideman, supra note 300, at 56
("In many cases, an individual with a record of disability.., who does not have a current disability
does not need reasonable accommodation, but rather needs non-discrimination.").
employers may have difficulty providing such persons with accommodations
even when they are needed.317 However, the same issues often arise in
"actual disability" cases,318 which is why the duty to accommodate is
typically analyzed on a case-by-case basis,3" 9 balancing the needs of the
employee or applicant requesting an accommodation against the employer's
burden in providing an accommodation. 20
Extending this analysis to the present context,321 neither the fact that
some individuals may not need accommodations, nor the potential difficulty
of providing accommodations, should preclude individuals with a record of
disability from asserting that their own disability-related limitations must be
accommodated.322 Indeed, relieving employers of any duty to accommodate
323atosnsuch individuals' lingering or recurring impairments, or any limitations on
their ability to work caused by stereotypical assumptions about their
conditions,324 would be inconsistent with Congress' intent that disability-
317. See Friedland, supra note 12, at 186 ("For purposes of requiring accommodation ...it is
unclear what the [ADA's record of disability provision] could mean. How would an employer
accommodate a record of a disability?").
318. See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hile a given
disability may limit one employee (and therefore necessitate a reasonable accommodation), it may
not limit another."); Nawrot v. CPC Int'l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 725 (N.D. 111. 2003) (discussing "a
disabled employee who does not need an accommodation to perform his essential [job] duties");
Pavone v. Brown, 10 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 251, at 876 (N.D. I1. 1997) (noting "the
difficulties of trying to accommodate an employee whose disability is aggravated by job-related
stress"), affd, 165 F.3d 32 (7th Cir. 1998); Mark DeLoach, Note, Can't We All Just Get Along? The
Treatment of "'Interacting With Others" as a Major Life Activity in the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1343 (2004) ("Many times, employees with mental disabilities do not
need tangible accommodations.").
319. See Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717-18 (E.D. La. 1996) ("Not all
disabilities limit people in the same way. The ADA is designed to account for these differences by
allowing an employer to fashion an accommodation based on one's particular limitation.") (citation
omitted), affd, 134 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 1998); cf Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052,
1071 (9th Cir. 2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing an interpretation of the ADA that
"effectively bars [an] entire class of. . . disabled [persons] from receiving ADA accommodations").
320. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he ADA ... grounds
accommodation in the individualized needs of the disabled employee and the specific burdens which
such accommodation places on an employer."), vacated on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); cf Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable
or not is a highly fact-specific inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties.").
321. See generally Gilbert, supra note 24, at 674 (asserting that "the same individualized
assessment should be accorded in . . . 'record of' cases" as is typically utilized in cases involving
"actual disabilities").
322. See, e.g., Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 338 (D. Kan. 1997) (rejecting an
interpretation of the ADA that would discourage employers "from attempting to work with people
who, though not actually disabled, feel themselves in need of some special treatment from their
employer to help them obtain or keep their jobs").
323. See Gilbert, supra note 24, at 674-75 ("[C]ourts should refrain from disavowing reasonable
accommodations under the 'record of' prong [of the ADA] .. . . Bright line rules preventing
accommodation in 'record of' cases would fail to address the residual effects of an impairment upon
a particular individual.").
324. See Dalton v. Suburu-lsuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1998) (indicating that the
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related limitations be accommodated "wherever possible. '32 5 The extent to
which employers must accommodate individuals with a record of disability
instead should be resolved on a case-by-case basis, 326 just as it is in actual
disability cases.327
employment opportunities of individuals with a record of disability may be limited by an
"employer's preconceived notions of disability"); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 78
(M.D. Fla. 1977) (discussing "individuals whose past handicap[s] continue to effect their present
ability to find and retain employment"). See generally Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (observing that "those who at one time had a disabling condition" may face a "continuing
stigma").
325. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (construing Rehabilitation Act);
see also EEOC v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 949 F. Supp. 403, 409 (E.D. Va.
1996) ("One of the principal purposes of the ADA is to encourage employers to accommodate
legitimately disabled employees.").
326. See Abell et al., supra note 22, at 793 ("[E]mployers should be aware that a record of a
substantially limiting impairment may, under certain circumstances, give rise to an employer's duty
to provide reasonable accommodation.") (emphasis added).
327. See generally D'Amico v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F. Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) ("An individual analysis must be made with every request for accommodations and the
determination of reasonableness must be made on a case by case basis.") (emphasis added).
46
